

INDIA

BY

H. H. DODWELL

*Professor of History in the School of
Oriental Studies, University of
London*

*Joint Editor of Cambridge
History of India*

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INDIA

PART II

CHAPTER V

INDIA UNDER THE CROWN, 1858-1918

IN 1858 the East India Company's administration of India was brought to an end. An Act of that year transferred the conduct of Indian affairs from the Directors of the Company and the Board of Control to a secretary of state aided by a council—the Council of India. The change is usually ascribed to the occurrence of the Indian Mutiny, which was considered, probably with great injustice, to have been occasioned by the faults of the Company, whereas the catastrophe seems to have been caused more by the Company's virtues than by its errors. In fact, the Mutiny did not so much produce the change of government as fix its date. Even in 1833 men had begun to foresee and prepare for the abolition of the Company. In 1853 the Crown had been given the power of nominating a number of the directors. Its authority was gradually overshadowing that of the Company, and, even if no mutiny had happened, the change of 1858 would certainly have come to pass in a comparatively few more years.

In many respects the change was hardly more than a change of form. The Government of India continued to follow along the lines of progress already laid down. The Company's covenanted service became the Indian Civil Service, but the new method by which it was recruited, open competitive examination in place of nomination by the Directors of the Company, had been introduced

by the Act of 1853. The Governor-General after 1858 has been more usually known as the Viceroy, but his statutory title remained unchanged and his powers unaltered. The change of government was quickly followed by extensive law reforms, but those reforms were the result of inquiries and discussions which had been going on for thirty years. Rapid progress was made in the spread of education, but the policy had already been laid down in a famous despatch of 1854. Public works received great and increasing attention, but the Company's government had already shown the way. In fact, the government of the Crown was destined not to reverse but to develop the principles which the government of the Company had adopted.

But at the same time important differences emerged. The attitude of the new government was more decided, the influence of Western ideas more evident, the transformation of India more rapid. So far the development was due to the fruition of earlier policies, and would have been brought about just the same even if the management of affairs had been left to the old agency. But in one important respect the new rule carried with it a new and profound influence—the influence of the Crown itself. Of course, the Company had always been recognized in England as simply the instrument by which the Crown exercised its responsibilities and powers in India. The idea was implicit in the earlier statutes passed by the Parliament, and formally declared by the Acts of 1813 and later years with a growing emphasis. But this fact was obscured from Indian eyes. Every order sent from London to Calcutta went in the name of the Company, even when dictated by the ministry and disapproved by the directors, so that only a small number of unusually well-informed Indians, such as Ram Mohun Roy and his group of friends, were aware of the true position. All the treaties with the Indian princes had been made in the Company's name; they were allies, not of the Queen,

but of the Company. The consequence was that the note of personal allegiance to a specific sovereign was lacking. The lack was supplied in 1858.

Readers of Queen Victoria's letters of that period will remember the keen interest which she took in the new arrangements and her solicitude for the well-being of her Indian dominions. Malicious wits represented her and the Prince Consort debating whether she should assume the titles of the Mughal emperor. She set up an Indian munshi to teach her a little Urdu, so that she might be able to say a few words in their own language to the Indian aides-de-camp whom she appointed. She issued a proclamation, in the phrasing of which she was hard to please, promising to India an impartial government which would uphold the rights of every creed, and which would pursue no schemes of conquest, and which would ensure to her Indian subjects such employment as they were competent to undertake. She watched with a critical and anxious eye the relations of her Viceroys with the Indian princes.

These Viceroys form a long and distinguished series of men, whose names are more familiar to the English reader than those of either the Englishmen who served under them or the Indians who rose to eminence by spreading abroad among their countrymen the political ideas learnt from the West. But familiar as they are, and deep as were the influences of many of them, the government of each, rarely extending beyond the customary five years, was too short to form an epoch or even a chapter in history. The important movements which take place stretch over wider periods, and often continue on their course regardless of viceregal support or opposition. No history of modern India can be based upon a narrative of the doings of these swiftly-passing Governors-General. But on occasion they played decisive parts, and, before proceeding to discuss the larger general changes which have been in progress since 1858, it may

be well to sketch briefly the main problems which they had to meet and in some cases their individual methods of approaching them.

Lord Canning, the last Governor-General under the Company and the first Viceroy, was probably better fitted to inaugurate the new regime than to dominate the fierce struggle amidst which the old regime had ended. The men who had crushed the Mutiny had been men of the stamp of John Lawrence and Nicholson, eager to smite the Amalekites hip and thigh, and convinced that in so doing they were carrying out the purposes of the Most High. So long as the rebellion lasted Canning held only a secondary place. But as peace was re-established and deliberate policy superseded military decision his grave, well-ordered mind and mild temper enjoyed a wider scope of influence. To him is largely due the reorganization which was carried through in the years immediately following the Mutiny. He reformed the army, the administration of law, the methods of finance, and indeed the whole procedure of the Government of India. He and his three successors, Lord Elgin, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, in the years 1858-72, thus carried out the wide reconstruction which characterizes the early years of Crown government, and which will be described in later pages.

In general the main interest of the period lies in internal affairs. But from the time of Lord Lawrence down to that of Lord Dufferin external policy recovered not a little of its old importance. The years following on the Crimean War had been marked by the development of a new and definite Russian policy. The Russian Government had been much perturbed at the ease with which the British had been able to find continental allies to assist them in resisting Russian policy in Europe, while the Russian emperor had been incapable of retaliating. St. Petersburg had therefore resolved to revive its policy of Central Asian expansion, not for

the sake of the territory which might be occupied, nor for the sake of the trade which might be gained, but in order to secure a position within striking distance of India, and thus acquire the means of influencing British policy in Europe by threatening the British position in India. In the course of the twenty years following the Crimean War the Russians steadily pursued this aim, advancing their main base from Orenburg to Tashkent, and at last establishing Russian power on the frontiers of Afghanistan, so that that country alone separated British from Russian territory.

Afghanistan thus acquired in reality the political importance which she had been wrongly thought to possess in 1838; but for a long time the British viceroys refused to recognize the new position which had thus developed. Memories of the disasters of the former Afghan War made them most reluctant again to intervene in that ill-omened country. The old amir whom the English had attacked in 1838 had been restored by them after the war. In 1863 he died, and his dominions were at once ravaged by a prolonged war of succession. The rival claimants repeatedly sought the help of the Government of India. But for a long time help was steadily refused, in pursuance of the policy which its defenders oddly called the Policy of Masterly Inactivity. The chief exponent of this was Lord Lawrence, who had become Viceroy in 1864. But even he was driven to abandon his position when the successful claimant, Sher Ali, was reported to be negotiating with his Persian and Russian neighbours, and at the very end of his administration Lawrence agreed to pay him an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees a year. For some years this met all the needs of the case; but when in 1873 the Russians occupied Khiva, Sher Ali desired the protection of an alliance and a conference was held at Simla. The Afghan envoys desired a defensive alliance in case their country should be attacked by the Russians and a

recognition of the amir's favourite son as his appointed heir. Lord Northbrook, who was then Viceroy, considered that this offer should be accepted, subject to a condition that the British were to be the judges of the propriety and need of affording armed assistance to the Afghans. But the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India in Mr. Gladstone's first ministry, refused to accept these proposals.

This decision was a grievous mistake. Seeing that the British would promise no help against the Russians, Sher Ali naturally concluded that he must make the best terms he could with them. He sought, and obtained, their recognition of his favourite son as his heir, and he entered into frequent communication with the Russian authorities, in full confidence that the British Government would take no active measures. But circumstances conspired to render this most reasonable conclusion entirely fallacious. A General Election drove Mr Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll from office, replacing them by men convinced of the need of a more active foreign policy. Disraeli as Prime Minister, and Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for India, took a serious view of the position of affairs in Central Asia. They were particularly troubled by the fact that their information of developments in that region depended mainly on the reports of an Indian agent at Kabul, who was suspected of saying no more than the amir desired him to say and whose statements at times conflicted sadly with news received through other channels. Salisbury was particularly eager to establish an English agent on the Russo-Afghan frontier, at Herat for choice. If only the Simla Conference had been held a little later, there is much reason for believing that the English and Sher Ali would have reached a firm understanding and that subsequent complications might have been avoided.

The new policy, however, met with difficulties in all quarters. When Salisbury instructed Northbrook to

re-open negotiations with Sher Ali, Northbrook felt sure that the opportunity had passed away, and offered such obstruction to the policy of the Home Government that co-operation between the two heads of the Indian Government became difficult, and ultimately impossible. Northbrook resigned, and Lord Lytton was appointed in his stead, expressly to carry the new foreign policy into effect.

The new Viceroy was a man of decided if flamboyant character, and of acute if erratic intelligence. The elderly and staid officials of the Government of India were profoundly shocked by what they deemed his lack of dignity, and were violently scandalized by his refusal to take them as seriously as they took themselves. The story was long current that once at a public reception the Viceroy had taken a gentleman by the beard instead of by the hand, exclaiming, "A virgin beard, I swear!" Indeed, it may be true that Lytton was at his best organizing and playing his part in great pageants. King Edward VII as Prince of Wales had visited India, in 1875-6, and had been received with great enthusiasm and with the pomp and circumstance due to the future King of England. In 1877 Lytton took full advantage of the feeling thus aroused to proclaim Queen Victoria as Empress of India in a durbar held at Delhi with extraordinary magnificence, attended by all the ruling chiefs and magnates of the whole country, with their followers in chain-mail contrasting with the rifles and artillery of the best army India had ever known. Such a riot of colour, such contrasts of the medieval and modern worlds, such a symbolic gathering of the East to do homage to the West, furnished an occasion into which Lytton could throw himself with whole-hearted zeal. But they gravely misjudge the man who fancy that such things were all he really cared for. The contrary is proved by his earnest efforts which led to the formulation of a new and most beneficent policy to deal with the periodic

famines then afflicting India ; and his handling of Indian foreign policy proves, too, that he was not a man who could safely be neglected. Sent to India in order to carry a certain policy into operation, he forced the Home Government into conformity with principles which they had laid down, but which developments in the European situation had induced them to modify if not to abandon.

The main object which Lytton had been directed to secure had been the reception of a British agent in Afghanistan. Long discussions were held between the British frontier officials and an Afghan mission ; but no progress whatever was made. The Afghans evaded all endeavours to gain acceptance of the British demands. Then in 1877 a Balkan crisis arose in Europe. Great Britain and Russia were arrayed on opposite sides. The Queen insisted on her ministers taking up a strong position and pursuing a vigorous policy ; they were not unwilling to carry her desires into effect. Indian troops were sent to Malta ; and Cyprus was occupied. Another European war seemed to be fast approaching, until Bismarck, in his rôle of the Honest Broker, succeeded in bringing the disputants to the Congress of Berlin, whence Disraeli returned bringing, in his famous phrase, Peace with Honour. But these events had strong repercussions in Asia. General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, seems to have been convinced, even if he was not formally instructed, that an Anglo-Russian war was a virtual certainty, and that everything must be done to secure the advantage of the initiative. He marched three columns of Russian troops towards the Afghan frontier, and at the same time sent a mission to Kabul with a draft treaty which Sher Ali was to sign unless he preferred to see the Russians invade his country and establish in his stead his refugee nephew, Abdur-Rahman, who had long lived under Russian protection. Sher Ali had little real choice. Events were pushing him into a position which the British could only

regard as one of hostility to themselves. He forbade the Russian mission to cross his frontier, but sent no orders to prevent its doing so; and when the mission ignored his commands and moved forward, he gave way and welcomed it at Kabul. He had thus conceded to one of his two great neighbours what he had denied to the other.

Both Lytton and the English cabinet were agreed that the new position thus established must be cleared up, and it was resolved to demand that an English mission should be received at Kabul. No answer being received within the appointed time, a mission was despatched by way of the Khyber Pass. But when it reached Afghan territory at Ali Masjid, it was ordered by the Afghan commandant to withdraw—otherwise he would open fire upon it. This refusal led directly to the Second Afghan War.

It is easy to scold Salisbury and Lytton as having pursued a policy of provocation which brought the war about. But such opinions are based on nothing more than half-truths. Lytton's critics forget the difficult position created by Argyll's rejection of Sher Ali's proposals, and the liberty of action which the European situation gave to Kaufmann. Neither Lytton nor any other Englishman would have bothered the amir if he had not received Kaufmann's mission. But as soon as the Russians chose to make a definite effort to bring the amir within the circle of their influence and control the English were entitled to do everything in their power to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a vassal Russian state. It might, perhaps, be argued that it would have been more proper to make war upon the Russian aggressor than upon the Afghan victim. But that is one of the childish absurdities to which the application of abstract principles to foreign policy sometimes leads. War with Russia would have carried with it many disadvantages which were not attached to a war with Sher Ali,

and would not necessarily have settled the Afghan question.

The war was, in fact, precipitated by Kaufmann's miscalculations rather than by Lytton's policy. If the Congress of Berlin had broken up without achieving a settlement of the European questions, Kaufmann would have been free to impose a Russian alliance on Sher Ali and then to support him against all English attacks. But the Treaty of Berlin chanced to fall just at the moment when he had driven the amir into an open breach with the English but before he could carry his plans to completion.

The Second Afghan War illustrated once more the ease with which Afghanistan may be overrun by an organized force. The English advanced by the Kurram and the Khyber Passes, and easily brushed aside all opposition. As they neared Kabul, Sher Ali fled for shelter to the Russians who had betrayed him to his ruin, and his son Yakub took refuge in the English camp. With Yakub, the natural successor to the Afghan throne, an agreement was speedily made. By the Treaty of Gandammak Yakub was recognized as Amir of Afghanistan; in return he agreed to accept an English resident at Kabul, to conduct his external policy in accordance with English advice, and to assign the Kurram district together with the southern districts of Pishin and Sibi to them.

This swift success was comparable with the like success which had attended Auckland's early policy in Afghanistan, and in some respects, though fortunately not in all, the English found themselves in much the same position as they had formerly occupied. The new amir, though not an old and discredited man like Shah Shujah, was weak and unreliable. In 1879, as forty years earlier, the Afghans viewed the establishment of a British resident at Kabul as foreshadowing the reduction of Afghanistan to a dependent position like that occupied by the native

states in India. The resident, Cavagnari, lacked the art of the true diplomatist, and was perhaps scarcely better fitted for his post than had been the ill-fated Macnaghten. In these respects Lytton's settlement was scarcely better than Auckland's. The recognition of Yakub was unavoidable; but Lytton committed needless mistakes in posting the British agent at Kabul, where he provoked political jealousies, instead of at Herat, where he would not have done so, and in choosing Cavagnari himself for the office. In other respects, however, as events were emphatically to prove, Lytton showed a shrewd grasp of facts which Auckland had never possessed. Yakub was to maintain his own position—there was to be no British occupation, and the cession of Pishin and Sibi ensured to the British the power at any time of operating on the flank of an army moving westwards through Kabul towards India. In another respect, too, Lytton showed better judgment than Auckland. He had in Roberts a young, energetic and very skilful soldier, while Auckland left the command of his troops to an old and worn-out man with no experience of Asiatic troops.

The consequences alike of Lytton's mistakes and of his successes swiftly developed. Yakub could rule the Afghans no better than the earlier British protégé. Jealousy of English intentions grew and swelled. Within a couple of months after his arrival at Kabul, Cavagnari and the escort of his mission were massacred in the course of a mutiny of Afghan troops. Everyone at once recalled the tragic course of events a generation earlier—the murder of the English envoy, the massacre of a whole brigade of British and Sepoy troops. But the freedom of military action which Lytton had carefully retained reversed the parallel. There was no long and intolerable delay while regiments, supplies and transport were being assembled. Roberts marched at once on Kabul and occupied it all through the winter of 1879-80. Yakub abandoned his throne, and retired to live for the next

forty years a pensioner in British India, and for the moment Afghanistan was left without a king. Lytton's thoughts turned naturally to the plan of allowing Afghanistan to fall back into that three-fold division—Herat, Kandahar and Kabul—which had long been in existence. A member of the old ruling family was recognized as ruler of Kandahar, and tentative conversations were begun in London regarding the possibility of allowing Persia to occupy Herat. For some months the country was full of uncertainty, tumult and war. Ayub Khan, a son of Sher Ali, attempted to drive out the prince whom Lytton had established at Kandahar, and at Maiwand inflicted a severe defeat on a body of British troops, driving them to seek refuge in Kandahar itself. Their relief furnished the occasion of one of the classic achievements of British arms in Asia. Roberts was still at Kabul. As soon as the news reached him he formed a movable column and marched to relieve Kandahar. For twenty-one days all news of him was lost. The public, alike in India and in England, was torn with fierce anxiety, born of memories of earlier disasters in a country proverbial for its blind and tortuous valleys. At last the news arrived that he had reached Kandahar and had scattered the followers of Ayub Khan. He and his men had marched 313 miles in 21 days.

Roberts's swift decision and accurate appraisement of risks are beyond praise. But another man deserves a share in the credit for that successful enterprise. This was Abdur-Rahman, the nephew whom Sher Ali had, in earlier days, driven out of Afghanistan into refuge with the Russians at Tashkent. Abdur-Rahman was one of those violent, pitiless men who, justified by a strong, clear intelligence, combine a fanatical belief in themselves with a deep contempt for others. He had seen his opportunity in the confusion into which Afghan affairs had fallen, and had moved into northern Afghanistan at the head of a small party of followers. His object was,

not to attack the English, but to secure their support. He and they had quickly got into touch. He was speedily recognized for what he was, and, in order to confirm this favourable impression, he used all his influence with the chiefs through whose lands Roberts was to march to induce them to assist and not to hinder the English movements.

Meanwhile, in England, the Disraeli Government had fallen. The Prime Minister's support of the Sultan had been very unpopular in England, and Mr. Gladstone had used his matchless powers of moral invective to exaggerate this feeling to the highest possible point. At the same time Lytton's Afghan policy had been bitterly attacked, and many Englishmen were persuaded to believe that there was no material difference between the policies which had led to the First and Second Afghan War. When the Liberal Party came into power after the general election of 1880, it was pledged to restore Pishin and Sibi to the Afghans and to undo as far as possible all that Lytton had done.

Lord Ripon was chosen as the Viceroy to replace Lytton, for Indian policy had for once in a way occupied a prominent position in a party struggle and it was obviously impossible for Lytton to retain his office. The new Viceroy had acquired some experience of Indian administration by serving as Under-Secretary of State for India. He was a man of a genuinely Liberal turn of mind, and sailed for India firmly resolved to carry the Liberal policy into full effect. But a more intimate acquaintance with the position of affairs soon made him revise his opinions on relations with the Afghans. Indeed, he compelled the Government which had sent him to India to abandon its publicly declared intention of handing back the districts which Lytton had acquired. They were important in facilitating the defence of India on the north-west, and Ripon warned Lord Hartington that he would prefer to resign rather than be

the agent of their abandonment. He continued discussions with Abdur-Rahman where Lytton had left them, and ultimately concluded an agreement which preserved virtually all that Lytton had obtained by the Treaty of Gandamak except the right to maintain an English agent at Kabul.

This agreement with Abdur-Rahman naturally carried with it the abandonment of those ideas of splitting up Afghanistan which had been adopted merely because no suitable candidate for the government of the whole country had appeared. With the aid of the English subsidy Abdur-Rahman speedily made himself master of the whole region. Thus a ruler of Kabul, who had been impelled if not driven into the arms of the Russians by the misjudgment of a Liberal Government was replaced by one who had seen too much of the Russians and the consequences of relying on promises of external help to fall into a similar error.

I have already noted the main features of Abdur-Rahman's character. He was admirably fitted by the strength of his will and the ferocity of his nature to beat a turbulent and semi-barbaric group of tribes into order and obedience. His methods shocked and even horrified English observers. His punishments were deterrent and spectacular. A rebellious region would be long reminded of the sin and folly of revolt by pyramids of heads of those slain in the field and by the executioner. Captured brigands would be hung in cages of iron to expiate and repent of their crimes. Mere robbers would be hindered from repeating their robberies by having their offending hand chopped off. He was therefore rather an odd person for Lord Ripon and Mr. Gladstone to support. But politics are apt to make strange bedfellows, and Abdur-Rahman's methods of government were compensated by the certainty that he would never seek an alliance with St. Petersburg.

The period which followed, from 1880 to 1909, was

one of gradually decreasing strain in the region of external politics, so far as India was concerned. From time to time crises developed, but they were progressively less acute. On the side of Russia efforts continued to perfect the plans for threatening India in case the Imperial Government wished to put pressure on Great Britain. The Russians pressed down on to the northern Afghan frontier and into the region of the Pamirs, they built their railways, carried them down to the borders of Afghanistan, and assembled material which would permit their engineers to carry on the line to the Indian frontier itself. At one moment, during the Pandjeh crisis of 1885, when the Russians had attacked and driven away a body of Afghan troops occupying that position, war did indeed come within measurable distance. But the Russians had accurately judged the extent to which they could go with Mr. Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville. Later intrigues which were evidently being carried on in Tibet provoked Lord Curzon to send the Younghusband expedition into that country and compel the Lamas to enter into a treaty with the Government of India. But at no time did the situation develop that tension of feeling which had prevailed in 1878 and 1879.

Some of the credit of this must be given to the consequences flowing from Lytton's conduct at that time. His war had secured for India a stronger position on her north-west frontier than she had ever known since the time when the province of Kabul had slipped from the hands of the degenerate Mughal emperors. The whole history of India shows that whenever a strong power has possessed itself of the Afghan country, it has always taken advantage of its position to invade and plunder India. Whenever India has been strong enough to maintain a hold on the country beyond the Sulaimans, she has been able to protect herself from invasions. Such a hold it was Lytton's main object to secure. By

occupying Quetta, by the railway up the Bolan Pass, and the acquisition of Sibi and Pishin, he succeeded in turning the western approaches to the great barrier behind which over-land conquerors of India had always massed. Probably Lytton's obvious shortcomings have led men to undervalue the importance of his achievement. Perhaps nothing manifests it so fully as the comparative serenity of mind with which later Viceroy's of India could watch the preparations of the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan against a day which in fact never dawned but which a somewhat different development of European relations might easily have produced.

It is scarcely going too far to say that the German Emperor, Wilhelm II, decreed that Britain and Russia should never fight for the control of India as Britain and France had done in the eighteenth century. The development of German policy from the closing years of the nineteenth century produced a most remarkable change in the political groupings of Europe. France and England, Russia and England, hastened to come to an understanding in respect of their political differences. In regard to the first, India had long disappeared from the field of political rivalries. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the extension of French authority in Indo-China had raised the question of Burma. That country was essentially alien from India, though it had borrowed much of its law and most of its religion from that country. Though Burma and India had considerable land-frontiers, there was no natural highway such as the north-western passes offered, and the means of communication between the two had always been a matter of sea rather than land transport. The marches were and are a tangle of valleys overgrown with jungle and inhabited by primitive tribes.¹ For ages the Burmese kingdom had not been in effective contact with any greater states than its Siamese neighbour,

and it possessed therefore no standards by which it could measure its relative feebleness compared with the new power that had grown up in India. The first consequence had been demands made upon Calcutta signifying that the King of Burma was entitled to as much of Bengal as he needed and might chase his rebellious subjects as far as he pleased into that province. Hence the first Burmese War, which shore off from Burmese dominion the northern province of Aracan and the southern province of Tenasserim in 1826. In 1852 another war occurred, which cost Burma the territory dependent on the port of Rangoon. In the eighties the King of Upper Burma—all that was left of the original kingdom—endeavoured to secure the help, financial and military, of his French neighbours in Indo-China; this development caused a short war in which the King's military resistance was instantly overcome. A long pacification ensued, affording more than one picturesque episode for the pen of Kipling, in the course of which British civil authority was established over the whole area. The British thus became neighbours of the French territories on the upper Mekong, and inherited an undefined boundary, constantly liable to cause quarrels and misunderstandings. This matter was cleared up, along with other matters of dispute, by a convention made with France in 1902. Five years later a similar convention with Russia defined the interests of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia. Thus the way was cleared for that political co-operation in Europe which ensured that the forces of Germany and her allies should not be able to dictate terms to the rest of Europe.

This leads us on to the part which India played in the war that broke out in 1914. The organization of her forces had never been designed to permit her putting large bodies of men in the field at great distances from India itself. But when the crisis developed the need

of trained troops to help in the defence of France was so great that two infantry and two cavalry divisions of the Indian Army were despatched to Europe, and took part in the fighting that checked the German efforts, in the autumn of 1914, to reach the Channel ports, and this at a time when the allied commanders still had to learn the need of a vigorous and powerful artillery to assist the efforts of their men. At Neuve Chapelle, the second battle of Ypres, on the Aubers Ridge, and in the bloody but fruitless struggles of Loos the Indian troops played their part. At the close of 1915 the Indian troops were withdrawn from France, but only to exchange one field of war for another. In the course of the four years that the conflict lasted Indian troops were employed in almost every theatre of the war. They repulsed the Turks from the Suez Canal. They provided the corps employed in East Africa. The campaigns by which the Turks were at last driven out of Mesopotamia and Palestine were maintained largely by Indians. And the disasters which occurred, in the attempt, for instance, to drive the Turks out of Mesopotamia with wholly insufficient numbers and totally inadequate supplies, cast no shadow of blame over the men themselves. In fact, the war illustrated perhaps for the last time on a great scale the splendid results which from the time of Clive to that of Maude and Allenby have been won by Indian soldiers trained and led by Englishmen. What faults there were were the faults of a machine made to do work for which it had never been intended.

CHAPTER VI

THE REORGANIZATION OF INDIA

THE events which have just been sketched were in part the results of a thorough reorganization of the system and methods of government in India. In some respects government in the Queen's name carried with it of necessity far-reaching changes. In others the new government proved more responsive to the demands of public opinion, and more easy to arouse to a sense of its own limitations.

In the first class the reorganization of the army must evidently fall. The military forces in India had been divided into two distinct and jealous sections—the Queen's troops and the Company's troops. The Company's officers had always envied the superior status and opportunities of those who held the Queen's commission, while the latter had grudged the Company's men their higher pay and allowances. In some degree a *modus vivendi* had been reached. But in 1858 the distinction was an anachronism and had to be brought to an end. So far as the Company's European forces went the matter was comparatively simple. They passed into the service of the Crown. The matter was not well handled, particularly in regard to the rank and file, who claimed that they were entitled to their discharge and to a bounty if they chose to enlist in the Queen's service. This grievance produced what was called the "White Mutiny" of 1859. The reorganization of the sepoy forces, however, offered problems of much greater difficulty. European units, men and officers alike, could take their turn of duty

in India as elsewhere on terms which were equal to all. But officers holding rank in sepoy regiments would need special qualifications and would look to a permanent career in India. This question was solved by the establishment of the Staff Corps, into which an officer must pass if he desired either administrative or sepoy employment.

At the same time the sepoy forces underwent an extensive reorganization. It was resolved that in future they should never consist predominantly of men belonging to a single group. Class recruitment came into vogue. If the companies of a regiment were drawn from different sources, it was argued, the regiment would never be broken as a whole by a single set of influences. The Sikhs and the Gurkhas, who had assisted greatly in suppressing the mutineers, came into special favour, and were extensively recruited. At the same time the Company's Corps of Native Artillery vanished. A mutiny which could not carry with it a force of artillery would be much easier to reduce than one which comprised all the arms of the service. English military predominance was thus established in a more effective form than had ever been the case before. Traces still remained of the old system. Till 1893 there still remained the three Presidency Armies, each under its commander-in-chief. But they represented a mere detail of internal organization. The Indian Army had been brought into being.

Another amalgamation, similar to this in spirit, was exhibited by the High Courts Act of 1861. Ever since 1774 there had existed side by side two types of law-court. One was that of the King's courts, supreme courts they were called, established first at Calcutta, and then, after a considerable delay, at Madras and Bombay as well. These courts were established by royal charter. Their benches consisted exclusively of English lawyers. They

were completely independent of the executive governments in India, and occasionally wasted much time quarrelling with the governments regarding their privileges and jurisdiction. The reader may remember that among the difficulties with which Warren Hastings had to contend was the unreasonable attitude assumed by the judges of the Supreme Court of Calcutta. They had been established for two main objects. One was to provide the English inhabitants of the Presidency towns with justice after the contemporary English manner—slow, elaborate and costly. The other was to set up a tribunal which, lying far beyond the power of the executive, could hear and determine without fear complaints which Indians might have to prefer against the English agents of the government. They had long outlived the purposes with which they had been established, and were largely responsible for the continued maintenance in India of two distinct types of law—English law for Englishmen and Indian law for Indians.

Alongside of these also existed what were known as the Sudder (or Head) Courts. These were courts of supervision and appeal, established at each Presidency to control and if necessary revise the decisions of the chain of courts, civil and criminal, which had been set up in the districts. The Sudder Courts differed in most things from the Supreme Courts. The judges were appointed and removable by the orders of the local government. They were never professionally trained lawyers, but consisted exclusively of Company's servants who had undergone their apprenticeship to law in India itself. The laws which these courts enforced were not the laws of England, but the regulations passed by the Company's governments and the customary law of both Hindus and Muslims.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the maintenance of these two sets of courts, Supreme and Sudder, had evidently become an expensive anachronism. So far

back as the time of Warren Hastings an endeavour had been made to employ the Supreme Court to do the work of the Sudder Court by investing the chief justice of the former with the superintendence of the latter. But that had been defeated, mainly because it was feared that such a step would make the Supreme Court dependent on the Company's government, and so the rival courts, with their distinct legal systems, continued to exist. But when after the Mutiny the codification of Indian law was taken up in earnest, and was to become binding on the Supreme as well as on the Sudder and their dependent courts, the separate existence of the Supreme Courts was resolved no longer to be necessary. The two systems were amalgamated into the modern High Courts, the benches of which were to be filled, partly by professional Western lawyers, partly by covenanted servants who had served as judges in the lower courts, and partly by other persons who had held judicial office in India or practised at one of the Indian bars.

In the matters of army and judicial organization the establishment of government in the name of the Crown exercised a powerfully unifying influence. But the principal example of this tendency was exhibited in the political sphere. The century before the mutiny, despite the Company's rise to the position of the predominant power, had definitely left India divided into two distinct political sections. One consisted of the territories in which the Company's rule had been established; the other, of the territories remaining under the government of Indian princes. I have already called attention to the ambiguous position of these princes. A jurist, basing his opinion on existing treaties and ignoring all else, might argue that some at least were independent sovereigns so far as the internal government of their states were concerned. Though they were not entitled to go to war with a neighbour,

they struck their own coins, they administered a justice from which no appeal could be lodged, they raised such taxes as they chose in such manner as pleased them; and although in these matters the advice or remonstrances of the Governor-General might be obtruded upon them, yet it would be hard to produce sufficient reason to justify such action from an international standpoint and on the assumption that most of the Native States possessed full internal sovereignty. But such views evidently ignored important factors in the situation. None of the existing states had enjoyed actual political independence for longer than a short period. The leading Maratha chiefs, Sindia, Holkar, and the Gaikwar, had been generals acting under the orders and on behalf of the Peshwa at Poona, and their independence rested on recent and unacknowledged assumption. The Nizam at Hyderabad still professed himself in every form the lieutenant of the Mughal empire. The Rajput princes had been the vassals of that empire. The sovereignty which the states possessed was thus recent. It had been shorn of the power independently to manage foreign relations. It had been weakened by the admission under formal treaties of the Company's right to maintain in the territory of most of the larger states such a military force as made the princes in question dependent on the Company. In some of the states the Company possessed a right by treaty to intervene even in internal affairs. In all it had assumed authority to regulate successions. In many it "advised" the prince regarding the selection of his chief minister. It was clear, therefore, that even if the princes were entitled of right to exercise full internal sovereign powers, they were not, in fact, doing so. The truth is that in times of swift political change rights decay and vanish with disconcerting rapidity, and the same influences which had bestowed a brief enjoyment of sovereign power on the princes in the second half of the eighteenth century had been at work in the first

half of the nineteenth to deprive them of much that they had so recently gained. In 1858 the true position was that the princes exercised many sovereign powers but were not in enjoyment of sovereignty itself.

The facts of the situation had been obscured in part by the terms of treaties concluded before the Company had become or at the moment when the Company was becoming the predominant power in India, and in part by the fact that the Company itself was not a sovereign body. The treaties with their unchanging texts could not reflect the unalterable march of political events. The fact that the Company was not a sovereign precluded it from claiming the allegiance of any. The change of 1858 swept away one, but only one, of these obscuring circumstances.

To some extent the action taken in 1858 increased the obscurity of the situation. The Queen's proclamation as well as the statute of that year declared the existing treaties to be in force. It is doubtful whether anyone in London had considered the effects of this. It is, I think, impossible to avoid the conclusion that such a declaration should have revived the treaties in all their original force; that where, for instance, as in treaties with the Nizam, princes were ostensibly on the footing of allies and where sovereignty over their dominions was not claimed, suzerainty did not exist; that, as the Nizam was to declare two generations later, his internal sovereignty over his territories was as full and complete as the sovereignty of the British Crown over the territories of British India. But nothing is clearer than that this was not the intention either of the Crown, or of its ministers in England, or of its Governor-General in India. So far from receding from the position occupied by the Company, they continued and enforced every claim which the Company had made. The Company had, in fact, regulated succession, the Crown's government continued to do so, and declared its purpose in the most formal

terms. The Company had from time to time intervened in the internal government of the states; the Crown did so with much greater regularity and system. It must be supposed, therefore, that the confirmation of the treaties in 1858 was intended to confirm them only in that degree in which they were actually in force at that time, and that it was never designed to give a fresh validity to such portions of them as had been rendered obsolete by political developments subsequent to their signature.

While, then, the confirmation appeared to re-establish the conditions of 1818 or an even earlier date, such a consequence did not follow, and Queen Victoria stepped into the position vacated by the East India Company. But this in itself constituted a change of the first importance. Though the Company had never claimed the princes' allegiance, the Crown did. The duty of allegiance was thus laid upon them as a new obligation. It will be remembered that one of the questions in the earlier period to provoke much discussion was whether the princes should or should not be suffered to adopt an heir in default of natural issue. Both Lord Canning and the Home Government were strongly in favour of their being allowed to do so. Canning therefore issued to a large number of princes, including all the more important of them, formal documents declaring that among Hindu princes an heir could be adopted, and that among Muslims the normal line of succession would be followed, if the prince in question had no son. But at the same time he informed them that this privilege was dependent on the prince's loyalty to the British Crown. Such a declaration by itself could not of course constitute a moral obligation. But none of the princes, save possibly the Nizam, dreamt of repudiating the claim thus asserted, and the princes' acquiescence at the time, coupled with their repeated and public declarations of later dates, attests the sovereignty of the Crown over the Native States.

In fact, therefore, in 1858 the Queen succeeded to the position, though not to the title, formerly held by the Mughal emperor. Her authority was established over the whole of India, and at last the country formed a political unit. The change is illustrated in a great variety of ways. We have already noted the assertion and acceptance of the duty of allegiance. From 1858 until very recent times no sovereignty save that of the British Crown was ever acknowledged by the Government of India as existing there. This new attitude is exhibited in the fullest degree in the document known as the "Instrument of Rendition," by which the authority of an Indian prince was re-established in Mysore in 1881. For sixty years Mysore had been administered by the Government of India, although it had never been incorporated in the British territories. When it was decided to relinquish this direct administration, the terms on which it was handed over were carefully formulated. Perhaps the most significant aspect of them is the plain assertion of the Queen's sovereignty. The power of administration was given to the Maharajah; he was to co-operate with the Governor-General in such matters as railway policy; he was not to modify the system of revenue assessment and collection without the Governor-General's assent; he was not to re-establish a separate currency; he was to pay due attention to the Governor-General's advice, and he was to hold his government on the condition of allegiance to Queen Victoria. In other words, he became an hereditary ruler on behalf of the Queen. His powers were great, far exceeding those of any governor of a British province; but he was certainly not regarded as a sovereign prince.

This Mysore "Instrument of Rendition" is the only document of its kind. From our present standpoint it is specially interesting as displaying fully and completely the position which the Queen's government considered to be the proper position of the Native States. Although

no similar opportunity occurred of formally defining the position of other states, the general policy which was followed from 1858 down to the end of Lord Curzon's government in 1906 was closely parallel to the policy thus declared in the case of Mysore. Steady pressure was directed to bringing local currencies to an end—a policy inspired both by the economic advantages of a general uniform coinage and by the desire to make the Queen's sovereignty plain over the widest possible area. Still stronger pressure was used to induce the Native States to adopt methods of administration more in keeping with the nineteenth century than the methods which the princes had inherited from the past. The Company had already acted thus spasmodically, but what had been somewhat exceptional under the Company became regular and habitual under the Crown. Dalhousie, for example, had declared that he lay under no responsibility whatever for the administration of the Native States; the Viceroys from Canning onwards subscribed to the contrary doctrine that they were responsible. This attitude, perhaps, received its most pointed expression in a speech of Curzon's, declaring that the princes could not discharge their duties to the Crown if they neglected their administrative duties. But though earlier Viceroys may not have spoken so emphatically in public, their conduct shows that their attitude was in this matter similar to his. They intervened with advice, with remonstrance, and if need were with definite action, whenever they deemed the rules of good government to have been seriously infringed. The prince who slew a large number of his prime minister's kinsfolk, who inflicted the traditional but barbaric punishment of mutilation, or who suffered his state to fall into a condition of chronic misrule, would be admonished, would be received in British territory with a diminished salute or perhaps with no salute at all, and in the last resort would be removed from the government of the state.

The most interesting of these cases arose in connection with the conduct of Malhar Rao who succeeded as Gaikwar of Baroda in 1870. He mismanaged his affairs so grievously that within three years of his accession the Governor-General ordered a commission to investigate. A list of reforms was prepared, and Malhar Rao was desired to put them into operation. He did nothing, and the relations between him and the Resident at last broke into open quarrel, and the Resident accused the Gaikwar of seeking to compass his death by poison. A new commission, consisting of judges, political officials, and representatives from other Native States, was appointed to inquire into the matter. The commission heard evidence in public: an eminent English barrister was briefed by the Gaikwar to defend him. After prolonged sittings the commission reported. It was divided on the question of the attempted poisoning; but it was agreed on Malhar Rao's incapacity for rule. The Government of India then declared his deposition, and nominated as his successor a boy of another branch of the family, and the state was placed under a regency till he came of age.

For two generations then the Crown government occupied a position differing essentially from that occupied by the Company. It claimed allegiance from the princes, it supervised their government, and in case of need it removed them from office. But the differences did not consist solely in the assumption and exercise of superior authority. In other directions also it inaugurated a new policy. It expressly abandoned the policy of annexation. The directors had laid it down that no just and honourable accession of territory was to be avoided. Queen Victoria's proclamation on the contrary declared, "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions." Thus the process which had seemed destined to place all India under direct English government was brought to an end. A failure of natural heirs was not, as in the Company's time, to extinguish the states. Not

even prolonged and extreme mismanagement was to do so. Acts of rebellion themselves would not be visited by the international penalty of annexation, for the relations with the states were not reckoned to possess an international character. The declarations made by Canning to the leading chiefs gave evidence of the first. The Gaikwar's case exemplified the second. The rebellion in Manipur in 1893 evinced the third. In fact, the sovereignty of the Crown permitted a new view to be taken of Indian union. In the Company's day the only path to unity seemed to lie in the gradual but steady absorption of the states. But after 1858, it was found in the assertion of a duty of allegiance common to all, and in the revival of empire claiming in India universal sovereignty.

While the events of 1858 swept away the evidences of that dual authority which had existed in British India from 1774 or earlier, and established the political unity of India on a new foundation, other causes were working in the same direction in the fields alike of politics and culture. One of those was the development of communications, the other the spread of education. Both had been inaugurated by the Company: both reached fruition under the Crown.

Down to 1858 Indian communications were but little removed from the static condition in which they had lain from time immemorial. Travel was possible on foot, on horse-back, borne on men's shoulders, in dooly or palanquin, carried down-stream by the force of the current on a river-boat, painfully forced up-stream either by the wind or towed by men upon the bank. Much of the country was still jungle. None but military roads were metalled, and rivers were crossed much more often by ford or ferry than by bridge. It is hard for the present generation to realize how slow and inactive life was kept by such a system. Twenty miles was a great distance.

Men lived and died in their villages, knowing nothing save by vague and inaccurate hearsay of what was going forward even in the chief town of the province. These are the circumstances which create and perpetuate endless differences between man and man. Everywhere we have only recently escaped from such conditions of life. Here in England in the time of our grandfathers the people of one village regarded those of the neighbouring villages with suspicion and contempt; and yet the improvement of the English roads in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had long previously made travel unusually swift and easy. In India marauding bands might wander far afield; pilgrims might pass from Rameswaram facing Ceylon to Hardwar under the shadow of the Himalayas; groups of sturdy (and in former days armed) beggarmen might come and go; travelling grain-merchants, with their strings of pack-bullocks, would pass from regions of plenty to regions of scarcity, professional messengers, mostly Brahmans protected by their holy character, would be familiar with roads of a wide area, and bankers would have a network of agents in all the chief towns with which they dealt. But these last were the only private men, in the Company's days, who possessed information about the country as a whole. In many respects they resembled the international financiers of the West, in the width of their interests and their comparative freedom from local attachments. But they were few in number. The rest of the moving population, travelling, as a popular novelist has aptly said, "under the blanket of the dark," offer great scope to the romantic imagination but unquestionably formed only an infinitesimal fragment of the population. The people of India as a whole was motionless, incurious about what might be passing beyond the range of immediate vision, and separated by differences of speech into a great number of distinct, uncommunicating groups.

The consequence of this state of affairs had been that

the political dominion established by the Company over some two-thirds of India did not produce any particular consciousness of union. The provinces remained differentiated by language, by methods of administration, by local prejudice. Dalhousie, at the close of the Company's days, had, however, laid the foundations of a great change. He had caused the chief centres of British India to be linked up with the telegraph, he had prepared for the construction of railway lines, and he had reorganized the Indian post office. The effects of these material changes, vast as they have already been, are still incomplete. But in a couple of generations they multiplied the scanty flow of travellers which had trickled slowly and painfully along the ill-made Indian roads into a great flood of men moving hither and thither with unheard-of activity and speed. News passed in an hour which formerly would have taken days and perhaps weeks. Instead of the rare letters which might or might not reach their destination, the mail-bags, bulging with letters, newspapers and parcels, were carried with unprecedented swiftness and their contents distributed with remarkable regularity. This meant an ever-widening spread of knowledge. The men of one province were no longer strangers to the men of another. They became conscious of common desires and common interests. The conditions had been created in which political union might develop into political unity.

While the unwieldy mass of India was thus being constricted into less unmanageable dimensions, India itself was being brought into closer, more effective contact with the Western world. Here again the process begins in the earlier period with the development of the "Overland Route," as men called it, by way of Alexandria and Suez. This was not really an overland route—it was the revival of the Mediterranean route of world-trade, closed since the Turkish conquests of the fifteenth

century, and the change resulted from the development of the marine steam-engine. The reader will notice how in the nineteenth century the influence of Western science again asserts itself. In the sixteenth century it produces the ocean-sailing ship and establishes a Portuguese dominion of Indian waters; in the eighteenth it is military technique, which establishes a British dominion on the Indian sub-continent; in the nineteenth it is the steam-engine and telegraph, forcing India to take her place in a new and closely-knit world.

The steamship reopened the Mediterranean route. The early vessels of this type were incredibly wasteful. They needed constantly to put into harbour for fresh supplies of fuel and adjustments of machinery; so that land-locked waters like the Mediterranean and Red Sea were the natural spheres of their early activity. From Falmouth to Lisbon, from Lisbon to Malta, from Malta to Alexandria, from Suez to Aden, from Aden to Bombay, were easy stages which even the primitive steamer could normally accomplish. With the development of this route went, naturally, projects for cutting through the Isthmus of Suez and uniting the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. These projects originated with the French. English sea-power had brought their hopes of Indian dominion to defeat. But if the French could reach India by sea without having to guard themselves along the whole Atlantic route their strategic position would be enormously improved. Napoleon, when occupying Egypt, orders his engineers to inquire into the possibility of cutting a canal. A mistake in their surveys leads them to the belief that the Mediterranean is thirty-two feet higher than the Red Sea, and that the work is impossible. But the development of the "Overland Route" calls attention once more to the idea. De Lesseps assures himself that the old surveys were wrong. His friendship with the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail, secures him a concession. English diplomacy, alarmed at the changes which may be brought

about in naval power, does its utmost to frustrate the plan. But it fails. The canal is dug. It is opened to traffic in 1869, and the time-distance of Bombay from London swiftly falls to no more than three weeks, against as many months by way of the Cape in older days.

This tightened the bonds between India and Europe. The costs of transport fell, and as they fell a great development of Indian trade became possible. Bulky commodities—wheat, hides and skins, oil seeds, cotton—which had scarcely been worth exporting owing to the expense of carriage, came into growing demand in Western markets, and thus commercial intercourse spread and developed. And besides this, personal intercourse developed also. When the Cape route was the normal mode of reaching Europe, almost the only men of Indian race to sail thither were the lascars who were picked up in Indian ports to make good the gaps in the European crews. Visitors of higher caste were extraordinarily few. A couple of Maratha Brahmans in the eighteenth century, whom Edmund Burke befriended, providing them with suitable quarters and food; Ram Mohun Roy, the Bengal-reformer; another Bengali of the Tagore family—and the tale is virtually complete. Caste Indians always cherished a tremendous prejudice against sea-travel, relaxing it only in respect of the voyage to the East African coast or to Malacca. A prolonged voyage in English ships by the Cape was dangerous, tempestuous, and above all involved conditions of life in which a breach of caste observances was inevitable. The Overland Route was shorter, cheaper, less storm-tossed. The steamers soon became much more comfortable than the old sailing vessels had ever been. And while the facilities of Western travel were fast increasing, the regard in which old caste observances were held was weakening, and the penalty of their neglect diminishing. Indian visitors to Europe became much less infrequent, and direct contact

was made between India and the centres of European thought.

Within India, the telegraph had preceded the railway. But in regard to Indian communications with the West the Canal preceded the telegraph. In 1857 no means of telegraphic communication had existed. Projects had been formed; but still remained projects. The events of the Mutiny, however, proved the need of some means of quicker intercourse between London and Calcutta. Moreover, the Queen's government was probably more conscious of the importance of this measure than the Company had been. An overland telegraph-line was therefore laid, linked with the Russian and Turkish systems by way of the Mekran and Persia. This was soon found, however, to be little better than a make-shift. Passing through many jurisdictions, the messages were liable to great delays, while in Southern Persia it was a matter of difficulty to keep the line in repair, owing to the many uses which the tribesmen found for good copper wire. A submarine cable was then proposed. The submarine cable was then still in its infancy. Great difficulties occurred in the Red Sea, where the sharp coral rocks frayed the insulating material and hindered transmission. But at last the task was successfully achieved, and a cable under entire British control joined up India with England.

The more closely India was bound to London the greater grew, not only the effects of Western influences on India as a whole, but also the effective control of the Home over the Indian Government. This was a thing quite apart from the effects of the direct assertion of the Queen's sovereignty, and determined the degree of detail which the Secretary of State could put into his orders and the extent to which he could play a personal part in the Indian administration. The legal powers which the Secretary of State, in conjunction with his

council, possessed, were identical with those formerly exercised by the directors of the Company in conjunction with the Board of Control. The new government had been inclined to make a somewhat fuller use of its powers. A Secretary of State enjoyed higher political and cabinet rank than a mere President of a Board, and was consequently more likely to press his views of policy on the Governor-General than the President had been. His council, too, comprised a larger proportion of retired Indian officials than the Court of Directors had done, and was therefore more inclined where possible to overrule the proposals of their juniors still in office in India. But till 1870 the Government of India continued, as in the past, to be protected by its distance from London, and so still exercised the discretionary powers which it had long been accustomed to wield. The Red Sea Cable, however, deprived it of this protection and proportionately enlarged the effective powers of the Home government. No dependent authority can claim to be allowed to act on its own opinion when it is within reach of the telegraph. Few crises are so sudden or urgent as to preclude a telegraphic reference to the superior government.

Lord Northbrook in the seventies was the first Governor-General to record symptoms of the change that had occurred. His private secretary, Major Evelyn Baring, better known under the title of Lord Cromer, narrates how Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State, was inclined "to bring the Viceroy into the same relation to the Secretary of State for India as that in which an ambassador or minister at a foreign court stands to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." Both Cromer and Lord Northbrook held the view that the executive government of India had been vested by Parliament in the Governor-General in Council, and that this fact of itself made his position essentially different from that of the diplomatist, who enjoyed no statutory powers, and whose sole function was to aid the Secretary of

State in giving effect to a policy determined by the latter. Lord Salisbury's attitude was no doubt emphasized by his personal character, but the period at which the change emerges is significant. As time passes other evidence accumulates. When Lord Ripon reaches India as Governor-General in 1880 he finds the relation of the Home and Indian Governments very different from what he remembered when he had been at the Indian Office as Under-Secretary of State in the sixties. If he had known how considerable the change had been, he writes, he was not sure if he would ever have accepted the Governor-Generalship. The practice, said to have been begun by Lord Salisbury, of using private communications, not merely as the means of conveying his general views but also as a method of sending specific orders, developed, and towards the close of the nineteenth century became almost habitual. Mr. Gladstone fancied (mistakenly) that the Indian governments were not under such close control as formerly, and exhorted his Secretary of State, Sir Henry Fowler, to tighten up the screw.

The broad tendency thus was for the authority of the Home government to extend from the laying down of general principles of policy to the giving of specific orders on points of detail, to pass, that is, from exercising superintendence to exercising executive power. The chief cause of this, as I have pointed out, was the establishment of telegraphic communication between London and Calcutta. But a minor cause was at work as well. The Secretaries of State were in general men of greater political weight, better known and more prominent than were the Governors-General of their time. Sir Charles Wood and Lord Elgin, the Duke of Argyll and Lord Northbrook, Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton, Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon all illustrate the fact. It marks a complete reversal of earlier practice. In the Company's days the Governor-General was almost

always a more prominent personality than the President of the Board of Control. Once only in the period from 1858 to 1906 do we find the customary balance clearly reversed and the earlier personal relationship revived. That was when, at the very close of the nineteenth century, Lord Curzon was appointed Viceroy. Young, energetic, masterful, he had already earned a great reputation for knowledge and ability. As Governor-General he studied the questions that came up so closely, he formed such definite views upon policy, he was so convinced that he was right and that all who differed from him were wrong, that he proved uniquely intractable. For a brief period by dint of his forceful personality he almost succeeded in eliminating the consequences of the Red Sea Cable. If he could not at once get his own way he would fight and fight hard. If he could not win over the Secretary of State he would appeal to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; if the Cabinet resolved against him, he would on occasion even appeal to the throne. But such an attitude was too contrary to the general trend of things to be endured for long. He was, in fact, a man born out of due time. Could he have been nominated to succeed Dalhousie he might have won brilliant successes, and his name might have ranked among those of the greatest Governors-General. As it was, much of his strength was wasted in sterile conflict with the prevalent forces of his time, and at last even his friends in the Cabinet deserted him. For good or evil, the Home government had become the predominant partner in the management of Indian affairs.

The results of this were felt specially in two directions. Political opinion in London came to have a larger share in guiding Indian administration, and at the same time the foreign policy of Great Britain came to determine the foreign policy of the Governor-General. In earlier times Indian administration had generally been regarded as a thing so remote from English experience that it had best

be left to the management of the Governor-General. But as English liberalism developed, its adherents displayed the belief that their principles were universally applicable, and as radicalism developed out of liberalism, Radicals were all convinced that the autocratic character of the Indian government ought to be transformed into something much more in harmony with English institutions. Few believed that any rapid alteration of the political structure was possible, but many were convinced that Indian administration was far behind the times and should be brought up to the highest standards of contemporary philanthropy.

Hence sprang a constant pressure on the Government of India to enlarge its administrative responsibilities, especially by way of improving the moral and economic condition of the country. An indication of what was to come was afforded by the Act of 1858, requiring an annual statement to be laid before Parliament exhibiting "the moral and material progress" of India. By this time a large majority of thoughtful Englishmen had reached the conclusion that the first condition of retaining India as a British dependency was that India should benefit. The purpose which underlay almost all that the Company's government had striven for had thus emerged into the national consciousness as a settled and acknowledged thing. The efforts of earlier philanthropists were bearing fruit in abundance, and the idea of trusteeship was being put into practice by a generation which never dreamt of mandates under a League of Nations. It is perhaps not too much to claim that these modern developments were based on the sentiments and purposes embodied in Anglo-Indian government.

This moral purpose rose into steadily increasing prominence during the period we are now considering. It formed the basis of the policy of guiding, reforming and controlling the administration of the Native States.

Naturally the same conception spread into every field of Indian administration. In no respect is it more evident than in the matter of land revenue. Here, as the reader will remember, the Company's servants had inherited a vicious system which had sought no higher purpose than the extraction of the maximum revenue. Everywhere at first the English government had levied a revenue which in fact was excessive, whether under the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, or under the ryotwari settlements of Madras or Bombay. But the burden of taxation was steadily lightened, in part by the economic improvement of the country, in part by the deliberate policy of the government. The era of internal peace which began in 1818 brought with it increasing cultivation, the rapid spread of a money economy, higher prices, freer markets, and at last improved communications which quickened the whole economic activity of the country. A multitude of internal dues were abolished. Trade expanded. Taxes could be paid with less effort. Revenues which, in the eighteenth century, could only be collected by a display of military force, came in the nineteenth to be collected regularly on demand without the aid of a posse of sepoys. At the same time the rates of the taxes were lowered, and the standards of assessment revolutionized. Where former governments had set up as the perfect assessment that which might perhaps be realized in a year of bumper harvests, leaving their officials in normal times to screw up the revenues as nearly as they could to this ideal demand, the Company's government in its later days and the Crown government throughout sought more reasonable standards which could be realised with regularity. Demands which had stood as high as half the total produce of the land, and even then were thought moderate, dropped to half, and to less than half, the surplus remaining over when the costs of tillage had been met. The peasant remained a poor man; but the

demands made on him were everywhere lighter than he had known for centuries.

The same spirit which inspired this reduction in the rates of taxation was exhibited in the development of a famine policy. Famines had grievously afflicted India, as they had always afflicted every agricultural country where the population presses hard on the resources of the soil. Failure of the periodic rains meant a complete failure of crops. Cattle and men would perish in great numbers, and the land revenues became impossible to collect. Primitive communications rendered such catastrophes almost impossible to deal with whenever they attacked a considerable area. When pack-bullocks afford the chief means of transport, it is impossible to carry food-stuffs into regions of scarcity, because the bullocks themselves must be fed and watered and over a long journey could not carry enough to feed themselves and supply starving men. In meeting these problems the Queen's government found itself in a better position than any of its predecessors, for the creation of railways established conditions in which, for the first time in the history of India, the problems of famine could be fairly met. But the spirit of the men concerned was one not passively content to rest upon this improvement. Lawrence as Governor-General makes a public declaration that he will hold the district officials responsible for every avoidable death that takes place. Lytton, fresh from personal inspection of the horrors of one of the severest famines of the nineteenth century, appoints a commission to consider the wisest methods of dealing with these afflictions, and this step leads to the framing of a far-sighted policy. On average, the commission found, famines cost the Government of India a crore and a half of rupees a year. That sum was annually to be set aside and devoted to protective works—railways or canals—in areas specially liable to famine, and to the reduction of debt. At the same time a close watch was to be kept

in each district for the approach of famine conditions, and the provincial governments were to receive early warnings. Plans were to be prepared in advance for relief works which might with advantage be carried out. Schemes of organization were to be drawn up ; so that, whenever a famine should occur, the Government should be forewarned and prepared to meet it with all the resources of a modern state. These proposals were adopted. When in the time of Curzon their operation was tested by the occurrence of famine they were reviewed and developed. As far as can be judged, Indian famines on anything like their former scale with anything like their former loss of life will never recur, unless the country should relapse into her old primitive conditions and forsake the methods and teaching of the West.

Moreover, while India has been organized to resist famine, the extension of irrigation has at once diminished the area liable to famine and enlarged the resources with which it can be met. The reader may remember how in the Company's time Cautley and Baird Smith reconstructed ancient canals, choked up and made useless by neglect, and even drew on the sacred waters of the Ganges for fresh projects. On the whole, the Crown Government devoted more energy and money in its early days to railways than to irrigation. But this was only a passing phase. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century irrigation was taken up again, and fresh schemes of great magnitude undertaken and carried out. Of these the most impressive were the works planned and largely executed in the Panjab. They represented a new departure in their kind. In the past numerous canals had been dug to carry off the flood water as it came down the rivers with the melting of the Himalayan snows. But no attempt had been made to do this high up the courses of the rivers where they first entered the plains. But now great works were constructed

to impound large quantities of water which otherwise would have rushed uselessly down to the sea, and to distribute it along carefully-planned canals. By these means an area of many thousands of acres was brought under the plough.

Another economic development begun by Dalhousie and continued with vigour in the later nineteenth century was the organization of a Forest system to develop and protect the Indian forests. These had always been swept periodically by forest fires, kindled by some hunter or more often by the rubbing of the bone-dry branches in the fierce heats of May and June. Another primitive danger was the practice of many jungle tribes to burn down a patch of forest, to till it so long as it retained its virgin fertility and then to move on elsewhere. But these were accentuated by a new danger brought about by the very benefits of the British Government. In the eighteenth century both population and cultivation must have declined, and when British rule was established there was everywhere plenty of grazing lands. But these were steadily absorbed by the expanding agriculture, so that wide forest areas which the villagers had seldom visited became the feeding-grounds of their cows and goats. The former browsed upon the tiny seedlings, the latter devoured the shoots of young saplings. The trees cut down for firewood could not be replaced by the normal processes of nature, and over extensive regions the forest was in danger of destruction. The bare hill-tops no longer attracted rain: the soil was no longer enriched by the steady accumulation of leaf-mould: on the contrary, the rain, when it fell, beat violently upon the earth, washing it away and making the bare ridges valueless and sterile, while the rainfall itself diminished in the surrounding country. Dalhousie and his successors organized a department for the conservation of forests in order to check this economic degeneration. The

villagers were no longer allowed to drive their beasts indiscriminately into forest areas, or to fell trees wherever they chose. Denuded regions were replanted. Rides were cut to make the limitation of forest-fires easier, and the practices of the jungle tribes were watched and regularized. These measures were of necessity unpopular with the villagers, who found themselves straitened for pasture or firewood. But they were, in that long run which the common man everywhere is reluctant to reckon with, necessary and beneficial.

These measures are a fair sample of the reforming nature of the Crown's government under the influence of English public opinion. One large and most important field of activity was that of education. I do not wish to deal yet with that aspect of British rule in India, but have said enough to show in how many ways India was now exposed to the influences of Western thought and Western practice in matters of administration. Department after department was organized or reorganized, and the scope of government, the number of points at which it touched and influenced the lives of common men, was increasing at a tremendous pace. The princes whom the Company displaced had aimed at not much else than great armies and large revenues, the Company had at once enlarged the purpose of the state by adding to these regularity and honesty of administration, impartial justice, the extension of knowledge, the suppression of ferocious customs, and the Crown had gone further still, investing government with the functions of a modern Western state. One consequence of this, undesigned but inevitable, should be mentioned here. The new departures, railways and irrigation, forests, and so on, were mainly technical in character. The only persons who could possibly be entrusted with responsible posts in these new departments were men with a European training, that is, almost always, Englishmen. Hence followed a steady

expansion in the employment of Englishmen under the Government of India, as engineers, as educationalists, as doctors, for no sufficiently qualified Indians existed to take their places, and because it was strongly felt that the introduction of Western methods must be entrusted to men of Western race. But the tendency was liable to be misunderstood and misrepresented by those who were thus excluded from the possibility of responsible employment.

I must conclude this chapter by showing how the influences of London came to dominate the external policy of India. This development also rested ultimately on the development of communications, which rendered all nations infinitely more sensitive to distant events than they had ever been before. In its broad outlines, of course, the foreign policy of the Governor-General had always been determined by that of the English Cabinet. When the principal antagonist of Great Britain was France, the Governor-General uses every effort to root out French influence from the Indian Courts; the prince who conducts negotiations with Pondicherry lies under grave suspicion, the prince who allies himself with France is regarded as a national enemy. When Russian ambition supersedes French aims, then Russia holds the foreground in the policy of Calcutta. The Afghan War to which Auckland ill-advisedly committed himself was in a special sense the work of the Home authorities. In a way, then, foreign policy was always dictated from London. But in the Company's days and down even to 1870 this is true of the broad principles, not of the specific detail; and within the framework of general European friendships and antipathies the Governor-General enjoyed a larger degree of discretion in his foreign policy than in any other department of government.

This was implicit in the nature of things. Foreign relations are afflicted by periods of spasmodic activity.

Some order goes out from Paris or St. Petersburg, and its effects become evident to the Governor-General weeks, perhaps months, before they are known in London. If they have a hostile character, he must do his utmost to counteract them without waiting for instructions from London, otherwise a mere threat may easily become a *fait accompli*. The case for instant action is even stronger when the other party is an Asiatic state, for in that case no possible repercussions in Europe are to be considered. So it came to pass that the Governor-General pursued a foreign policy of his own, which he squared as closely as he could with the national policy, but which was coloured and determined by his personal views and by local conditions.

But this was only true down to the laying of the Red Sea cable. The reader will recollect what a change in attitude that event produced in the Home Government ; and that change was peculiarly marked in the sphere of foreign policy. That affords the very topic over which Lord Salisbury put special pressure on the Governor-General, Afghanistan. Was the Russian advance in Central Asia to continue unopposed until it was supreme in every country on the Indian border, or was it to be resisted, and the amir encouraged to form a close alliance with Great Britain ? Salisbury was for immediate action, the Governor-General for delay. Into the rights and wrongs of that hotly-debated question we need not now go—I have elsewhere endeavoured to define and value them. For our present purpose it is enough to note that the matter generates such feeling that the Governor-General resigns, smitten by conveniently-timed ill-health, and a new Governor-General, Lord Lytton, is appointed expressly to carry the Cabinet's foreign policy into operation. Lytton does so, though in a more active manner than the Home Government found (at a later time) they had intended. The second Afghan War was the result, and this, with what all good Liberals regarded

as Disraeli's iniquitous support of the abominable Turk, became an important feature in the General Election of 1880. The Government sustained a heavy defeat at the polls. Lytton was recalled and Ripon sent out to India in his stead. The two occasions in the nineteenth century when a General Election is found to involve a change of Governors-General were both associated with Afghan adventures. In fact, Indian foreign policy had become a question so closely connected with European affairs that it had a definite interest for the English elector. Indeed, this was the only aspect of Indian affairs likely to affect his vote.

In the second half, and especially in the last quarter, of the nineteenth century, Indian foreign policy altogether ceased to be a matter in which the Governor-General enjoyed a special degree of discretion, and became one in which no step, however small, might be taken without previously consulting the Home Government. The change, already apparent, is most clearly illustrated by the events leading to the *Entente* with Russia of 1907. On this occasion the Foreign Office ignored the views of the Governor-General, and saw no reason why he should be specially entitled to possess or express views. The Secretary of State for India backed up the Foreign Office and over-ruled the objections of the Governor-General to the proposal, and declared with emphasis that India could not have a foreign policy of her own.

This attitude carried with it disadvantages. The Russian *Entente*, for example, embodied provisions, such as the division of Persia into zones of influence, which were misunderstood by and very repugnant to Oriental minds. Again, the clauses relating to Afghanistan were adopted without any previous communication to the amir, and this fact seriously annoyed him and complicated his relations with the Government of India. Nevertheless, the development was unavoidable. It followed out of that contraction of the world which had been in progress

for many years, which was rendering the inter-action of states much closer than it had ever been before, and which was compelling all Foreign Offices to formulate their policies with an eye to conditions and interests of a world-wide character.

It is clear then that the half-century which followed the Indian Mutiny wrought deep changes in the constitution of India. It witnessed the unification of government by the abolition of those institutions which had originated in the dual nature of control. It unified the country by the assertion of British sovereignty over the Native States as well as British India. It brought India under Western influences, and multiplied her points of contact with the external world by the extension of trade, by the railways carrying both cultural and economic influences into the heart of the country, by the telegraph which brought her close to Europe, by the Canal which placed the Indian traveller, as it were, within a stone's throw of the Mediterranean. The same period includes a vigorous movement aiming at the improvement of material conditions, by the prevention of famine and the expansion of agriculture. Most important of all, the basis of the Indian Empire is transformed. In 1858 India was still held by the tenure of the sword. A great rebellion was being crushed and measures were being taken to render such a movement more difficult and more hopeless than ever. But the conception that India is held in trust, latent from the time of Warren Hastings onwards, exercises a growing power. The great conditions of the trust are that her people should enjoy a better-ordered, a more prosperous existence, and that the whole community should move forward, politically as well as materially. This object is inconsistent with the maintenance of a military dominion resting on armies, fortresses and arsenals.

CHAPTER VII

~~EDUCATION~~ EDUCATION AND POLITICS, 1858-1909

IN the previous chapters I have sketched very briefly some of the main influences affecting India during the two generations following the Mutiny. But one, the most important of them all, was deliberately excluded. This was the educational policy of the government. It will be remembered how Macaulay and Lord William Bentinck gave to educational policy a decidedly Western character, but how the Indian social system with its water-tight compartments had hindered the general diffusion of Western knowledge outside the limited extent of the literate castes. In 1854 Sir Charles Wood and Lord Dalhousie resolved upon reorganizing and expanding the system which had come into existence. Till then education had been managed by committees, including both Indians and Englishmen, nominated by the governments of the chief provinces. These were to be replaced by government departments, with a complete organization for administering the enlarged funds which it was intended to devote to education. Besides this the machinery for education was to be extended. Till then higher education had scarcely been attempted. The scheme of 1854 contemplated the creation of a complete system ranging from elementary schools at the base to universities at the summit. Nor were the tragic events of the Mutiny allowed to delay its introduction. In 1857, when Delhi had scarcely been recovered from the mutineers, Canning passed

through the legislature a bill authorizing the establishment of universities in India. This constancy of policy was at once notable and characteristic. It was notable because the events of the time might well have been made the excuse for abandoning or at least deferring the development of reforms, it was characteristic, for it involved the further opening of India to Western influences, and this has been the persistent feature of Anglo-Indian efforts from the time of Lord Cornwallis, for the last hundred and fifty years.

The new Indian universities were to be framed on the model, not of the old English foundations, but of a recent institution, the University of London. That had been brought into existence by the same wave of Liberal enthusiasm as had brought in parliamentary reform. Its object was to place a liberal education within reach of the middle classes at a moderate charge. It did not teach, it only examined; and in those days the value of written examinations as a test of capacity was highly over-rated. It was very natural for these ideas to be adopted by the Indian authorities as the basis of the Indian universities. Indians were poor; the costs of education must therefore be low. Benefactions for the establishment of university chairs were lacking. A residential system evidently was much more burdensome than one which suffered the student to live at home or in some cheap lodging-house. Indian universities were therefore made into territorial bodies. It was possible for the student, wherever he studied, to appear at the examinations and receive the degrees of the University of London. It should be possible then for a man studying anywhere within the limits of the Presidency of Bengal to take his degree at the University of Calcutta, and for candidates from Karachi or Poona to become graduates of the University of Bombay.

Within this loose framework was scope for an unlimited number of colleges, affiliated to the university

and preparing men for its examinations. A college might be set up at any place where the Government considered it was needed, or where local enthusiasm could provide funds, or even where a private man might think a living could be got out of such an establishment. It was not even necessary that a college should teach up to the highest examination of the university. It might stop short of the B.A. examination, and teach only up to the Intermediate, or, as it was long called in India, the First Arts.

No plan could have been devised to expand university education with greater speed. Its fruits soon became apparent in the numbers of men appearing for the examinations. They increased in geometrical progression. There was a still growing eagerness to acquire Western knowledge. There was also an equal eagerness among the literate castes to qualify for government service, which had from time immemorial afforded a considerable number of their members with a livelihood. A multitude of boys besieged high school and college with demands for admission. In the Presidency of Madras in 1857 there were in all 183 schools with 16,000 pupils, early in the present century there were over 30,000 institutions of various grades with a million and a quarter students. In Bengal, where the population is approximately the same as in the United Kingdom, the number of men seeking the degrees of the University of Calcutta rose from a mere handful to as many as were studying in all the universities of Great Britain and Ireland, and the University of Calcutta enrolled more men than any other university in the world.

This remarkable development was, however, top-heavy. While high-school and university were growing with extraordinary speed, elementary education was languishing and female education remained neglected. In Bengal with more undergraduates than England

only one man in ten could read and write. The motives which crowded the high-school benches and the college class-rooms did not touch the rural classes. The cultivator, in India as elsewhere, was a practical man who was sure that books would never teach his son how to plough and sow and reap, and who, in India as elsewhere, could always find jobs, minding the cattle or watching the crops, for lads of the age at which they could go to school. Their class therefore remained (and remains) "persistently illiterate." In 1883 it was recorded that children who had gone to elementary schools had usually forgotten in ten years how to read or write. "Having nothing to read (so it was observed), having no occasion to write, and no accounts to keep, they gradually forget whatever they learn and are as ignorant as if they had never been at school." Caste, too, acted as a check and deterrent. The same inspector of schools whose opinion I have just quoted commented on the impossibility for a low-caste boy of finding occupation other than that customary for his caste. The son of a village scavenger, having been to school, desired to become a trader. But "everything that he touches would become polluted, and no one would buy cloth or grain from his shop if he could buy them from any other."

While then in one direction education expanded swiftly, in another it was checked by the inherent apathy of the peasant or by the limitations of the Hindu social system. In fact, this educational policy worked very differently according as it was applied to a rural population or to an urban population. Among the first it was ineffective. Among the second it was vigorously operative. The villagers remained rural and oriental; the townsmen underwent strong Western influences

In part, no doubt, this was inevitable. But there were also grave defects in the policy that was pursued—indeed, the government could never shake itself free from the initial error of 1835. The object which Macaulay

cherished was to create a system as like the English system as possible, with the substitution of English for the Greek and Latin of English schools and universities. It was to be essentially a literary education, relying for its effects on the moral influences of English literature and thought. So for the most part, despite the modern efforts to extend scientific work, it remains. To this fact must be ascribed in great part the limited character of its appeal. The literate castes with their long traditions of literary studies took naturally and eagerly to the new curriculum, which suited their habits and led them to a natural career. But for other men the only useful knowledge was that imparted in a small number of medical and a still smaller number of engineering colleges. In short the general trend of education was neither useful nor vocational. Until recent times nothing was done to provide teaching that would benefit the artisan, or the trader, or the agriculturist.

Some of the blame for this must fall upon the period when the educational policy was formulated, rather than on the men who formulated it. In the mid-nineteenth century English education itself was almost wholly literary in character, and the men of Macaulay's generation could not conceive any other type. It is only in recent times that science has risen to its present position in the curricula of schools and secured recognition in the English universities as the basis, in its pure or applied forms, of higher technical training and as the source from which great industrial improvements may be sought. But although the government in India could not foresee this development, it must be admitted that Governors-General and their executive councils failed to recognize the importance of it till late in the day. The truth seems to be that down to the time of Lord Curzon they were far more concerned with the expansion than with the quality of Indian education. From that standpoint a literary education had much to recommend it. It could be done

cheaply. The building of schools and colleges could be more extensive if they had only to be fitted with forms and black-boards, and equipped with small libraries, without planned laboratories filled with expensive instruments. Moreover practical science classes are limited by the size of laboratories and the amount of apparatus; but according to Indian practice there was hardly any limit which could be put to classes in English and history. Literary was much cheaper than scientific education, and as regards the numbers that could be taught for a given sum of money more effective in its operation.

This bias towards the literary aspects of education was the more to be regretted because it hindered the application to India of what is most valuable in Western culture. Every people has its own literature, governed by its own conventions, and expressing the deepest feelings of the race. Every people benefits by a judicious study of the literatures of other races. But few individuals can so denaturalize themselves as to read foreign poetry with foreign eyes. The average Englishman finds it hard to attain a genuine liking even for French poetry. But the difference between English and French poetry is insignificant compared with that between English and Sanskrit poetry. Moreover, the social and physical worlds of the two people are so contrasted, that the value which phrases carry with them can be realized only by careful study and trained imagination. If it had been a matter only of acquiring some knowledge of English literature, we might well doubt whether in many cases the profit was worth the effort. Scientific method on the other hand holds a position altogether different. Not all men can be taught to understand an ode of Keats; almost all men can be taught to observe and to record. The recovery of a true curiosity about the world, and the accumulation of a great store of knowledge regarding it, knowledge largely capable of test and proof, is the great

contribution of modern Europe to human culture ; the spread of this movement to India was an object far more worth seeking than even the most intimate acquaintance with English literature ; and the effects of English education would have been far more beneficial if only half the number of Indians who can now read English had been taught to do so, provided a quarter of them had received a good scientific training

Another defect, akin to the preference for literary studies over scientific was the carelessness which permitted schools to expand beyond the supply of good teachers. The latter should have been the first consideration of the government. But it was not. The main purpose which inspired students to enter English schools was to secure a post under the government ; the men who most distinguished themselves secured their object : the next best took the highest paid posts they could find : those who could find nothing else to do took up teaching as a profession. Here again the government was obeying the somewhat dismal precedent of mid-Victorian England. Students of Indian affairs cannot but grieve that English educational theory and practice had not reached the modern standard when statesmen were planning an educational system for India, nor can any great blame attach to men who were seeking to give the best they knew. But at the same time it is evident that crowded schools and inefficient teachers must lead to education of an inferior quality. Here, too, considerations of public economy exercised an evil influence. To pay such a wage as would provide a large body of good teachers would have added enormously to the cost. In elementary schools teachers of a sort could be got for about the pay given to inferior domestic servants ; in high-schools masters might hope for the salary of an indifferent clerk ; in colleges a lecturer might get as much as a tenth-rate public servant. The choice lay between relatively high pay for teachers and a rapid expansion

in the numbers taught. The latter was unhappily preferred.

I say "unhappily," because the decision proved to be singularly unwise. Its educational disadvantages are evident. But it carried with it political disadvantages as well. The consequences of multiplying the numbers of matriculates and graduates was that the supply of them rapidly outran the demand. India was an agricultural country. Vacancies in government offices soon fell far short of the numbers of men more or less qualified to fill them. Other possibilities, the bar, medicine, journalism, were soon exhausted. The modern industries which were growing up did not need the services of men whose training was merely literary. The problem of employment became progressively difficult, and with this necessarily ran an increasing degree of discontent, primarily economic but potentially political. And since educationalists were the worst paid of all the educated classes, discontent was prominent among them. Schools and colleges might readily become centres of a propaganda, borrowed indeed from Europe, but very different from that which they were designed to spread.

The imperfections of Indian educational policy impaired its efficacy, but could not lessen the profundity of its influence upon the limited classes which fell within its scope. Contact with new ideas, with new conceptions of art, society, and politics, compelled men to think out for themselves the traditional assumptions in which they had been brought up. The intellectual lethargy into which Hindu society had fallen vanished. This is not the place in which to discuss the movements that developed in Hindu metaphysics, literature and art. We are here concerned with the Indian state, and must limit ourselves to political developments. But it must be remembered that these took place in an atmosphere of great activity, mental, literary and artistic. Western

education was powerfully stimulating the consequences of swifter physical communications.

Some of the subjects taught were new to Hindu culture. The most notable of them was history. The reader may remember the lack of interest with which the Brahmans of old had witnessed the rise and fall of empires. Hindu history was unknown save for the imperfect narratives of early Western enquirers, such as Elphinstone, the first man of any race to compose a history of India. The establishment of Muslim power had brought Muslim chroniclers to India, and occasionally a Persian-taught Hindu had sought to imitate their writings. But such efforts were, I think, inspired rather by hope of a patron's favour than by any genuine interest in history for its own sake. Moreover, the study of the Muslim chronicles could hardly suggest to the Hindu new political conceptions. To both Hindu and Muslim the king lay under a religious obligation to observe and to uphold the sacred law, and to both he seemed entrusted with a degree of power to which few actual limits could be set. But Western history suggested other thoughts. Here were institutions, not merely social such as those behind which the Hindu had fortified his religion and his race, but also political, such as he had never known save in embryonic forms long forgotten. Here, too, was a conception of law totally unfamiliar, not as something revealed to holy men in meditation, but as practical rules which should and could be enforced on all alike under pain of terrestrial punishment, and which could be altered and amended as easily as they could be made. Such limitations on the arbitrary powers of a government were at once novel and tremendous. That the subjects of a state should be politically active instead of being inert, that the rule of law might be a stern reality instead of an ideal, that every subject was entitled (according to many political authors) to political rights, were revolutionary conceptions. They provoked at once the inquiries,

"Why should not India secure a free constitution?" and "Why should political privileges in India be limited to Englishmen?"

Such thoughts began early to pass current in a new class which emerged into existence about the middle of the nineteenth century, and which became important and vocal by its close. This was what may be called the professional middle-class. Although its size varied from province to province and from city to city, it had certain common features. Its members were all English-educated. They were all professional or salaried men. They were almost all Hindus, and were drawn from that special group of castes which claimed an ancestral right to learning. Lawyers formed the most important and wealthiest element among them, with journalists a good second. There were unusual points among this group of men. They formed a class, not a caste. Membership fell to all who had enjoyed a certain training and succeeded in securing admission to a certain occupational group. Its members were not necessarily freed from the caste-spirit. Many of them would rather die than eat beef, but you would not see any of them rush forward in the public street to catch in their hands and cast over their heads the urine of the sacred cow. The light of orthodoxy had doubtless waxed dim in most of them. They formed an urban class, to be found in every city from Lahore to Madras. There had thus arisen a class of men, scattered over the length and breadth of India, with a common language and common interests. Possibly in very early days the predecessors of the modern Brahmans had formed a similar class. But its like had not been known in the Hindu world for at least a millennium and a half. Men thus united by speech, education and interests, became conscious of their similarities, and in this class the sentiment of Hindu nationalism was born and nurtured, under the stimulus of Western education, and of the new ease with which a man could travel from place

to place and communicate with his friends by letter and telegraph.

Given the conditions, the thing was inevitable. Here were men as highly educated as they could be in India, familiar with English political usages, versed in the writings of the more liberal English political thinkers—Mill's little tract on Liberty was a great favourite with them—and including men with a great natural gift for extempore speech. Why could not they form and control a government as well as these English foreigners, and why should they be excluded from responsible offices in British India? Among them the ideas and attitude which had made the past government of India by foreigners an easy matter had ceased to exist. The old-fashioned Indian had seen nothing unusual in the coming of a foreign people to exercise rule. It was, apparently, a duty which the gods had laid upon them. They were strangers, with peculiar and reprehensible manners, and an extraordinary form of speech which they expressed in an unfamiliar alphabet, but then something of the same was true of the inhabitants of any distant Indian province. The southern Brahman abhorred the Brahman of Bengal, for he ate fish. Neither could speak or read the language of the other. A collector was then a foreigner to the people of his district, but there was no community of feeling between the people of the various provinces to make them conscious of a general unity. Such a consciousness emerged in the class which was the special creation of the English Government. As Alfred Lyall once wrote: "The wildest as well as the shallowest notion of all seems to me that universally prevalent belief that education, civilization, and increased material prosperity will reconcile the people of India . . . to our rule. . . . It was the increased prosperity and enlightenment of the French people which produced the Grand Crash [of the Revolution]."

Lyall was writing in 1859, with the shadow of the

Mutiny still lying heavily over the Indian scene. But men before him had drawn not dissimilar conclusions. Lord Hastings, dwelling on the need of spreading Western education in India, observes: "A time not very remote will arrive when England will, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually . . . assumed over this country." Sir Thomas Munro, one of the very wisest of the East India Company's servants, said: "We should look upon India, not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should gradually be withdrawn." It may seem that these earlier statesmen took a more detached and serener view of future developments than the young Lyall. But the difference lies largely in the later regret at the prospect of relinquishing what had just been reconquered after a desperate struggle. All regarded the policy of education as the natural solvent of British military dominion in India.

In this they were unquestionably right. But it is also true that policy allowed the solvent to work with an unregulated freedom, and that the government failed to keep the other elements of its policy in step with the political fruits of education. Progress was, therefore, one-sided and haphazard, instead of being uniform and deliberately guided towards a defined objective. In this connection we must consider three main lines of development: the growth of the Press, the opening of higher employment to Indians, and the early measures taken to introduce some element of representative government into the structure of the Indian autocracy.

In the matter of the Press the Indian Government

had followed a most unusual policy. Metcalfe, a very distinguished Covenanted Servant, who chanced to be Governor-General for a short time between two regularly-appointed holders of the office, had in 1835 abolished the censorship which regulated the conduct of early Indian newspapers. He was inspired by the view that the newspaper was essential to the spread of knowledge: he hoped that the spread of knowledge would convince men of the virtues of the Company's rule, but thought that in any case "it is our duty to extend knowledge, whatever may be the result." The Indian Press thus became as free from restrictions as the Press in England. Before that time a number of short-lived periodicals, in English and in various Indian vernaculars, had been produced by Indians. Afterwards, with the growth of education, journalism grew rapidly. Hardly ever financially successful, frequently changing hands, essentially ephemeral, these productions were eagerly read among the rising middle class. By 1860 the vernacular press had risen to undoubted importance. At Calcutta, in 1826, 8,000 copies of vernacular works had been published: in 1853 the number had risen to 300,000: within the next four years it had doubled. During the Mutiny Canning re-established the censorship, but as soon as the Mutiny was over the censorship was withdrawn, and the production of books, pamphlets and newspapers by Indian writers, both in English and in Indian languages, resumed its growth. Its attitude towards the government was always critical; after the Mutiny criticism tended to develop into positive hostility. Occasionally an unofficial and extra-legal warning was given. In 1873 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal desired powers to restrain the writings in a newspaper of which the printer and proprietor were (ostensibly at all events) college students of eighteen and twenty. In 1875 the Secretary of State was calling official attention to articles palliating, if not justifying, assassination. In 1878 an

Act—the Vernacular Press Act—was passed, empowering the government, if necessary, to require the editor of a vernacular newspaper either to give a bond to print nothing calculated to excite disaffection or to submit his proofs for censorship. But the Act was repealed by Ripon before it had been in force for three years.

The Liberals of the day possibly failed, as many men of previous generations had failed, to recognize the difference between India and England. Where government rests upon popular suffrage press diatribes really are a safety-valve, relieving the feelings of the defeated party and counteracted by the approval of the other side. But under an autocracy the approval of an official press avails little to soothe the irritation or check the influence of men who do not and can never hope to enjoy office without a revolution. "My own opinion always has been," wrote a very capable and fair-minded lieutenant-governor, Sir George Campbell, "that an entirely free press is inconsistent with a despotic form of government, even if it be a paternal despotism . . . A government whose position largely depends on the sort of moral force due to a belief in its unassailable power, can hardly afford to be held up to the contempt of its subjects." "A free press and the dominion of strangers are things which are quite incompatible and which cannot long exist together," said Munro, adding that the first duty of a free press would be to deliver the country from a foreign yoke. Campbell was writing about 1880 : Munro in 1822. Campbell had, Munro had not, personal experience of an uncontrolled press. Campbell therefore attests the shrewd accuracy of Munro's pre-vision. The sound policy would have been, I think, to keep the Indian press in leading strings until the time had come to transform the basis of the government ; and since Ripon felt sure that no material alterations in the latter were advisable in his day, he and the Secretary of State judged ill when they resolved to restore to India the

English privilege of a free press. If they disliked the Vernacular Press Act, they should have amended, not repealed it.

This represents one direction in which English policy was unwise. Another was the tardy manner in which high and responsible office was opened to Indians. Dalhousie had desired, even before the Mutiny, to appoint an Indian to the bench of the Sudder Court in Bengal; he had desired to appoint an Indian Secretary to the new Legislative Council formed in 1853. In both cases he met with opposition. In 1861 the benches of the newly formed High Courts were legally open to Indians, but for a long time only one was appointed. The Civil Service had, since 1853, been recruited by open competitive examination, which was held in London and for which Indians were eligible to sit. Legally, therefore, the service which supplied the occupants of almost all the principal employments was open to men of the Indian races. But the superiority of English schools and colleges, the expense of a long voyage, the expense and difficulties in which Hindu students were involved by residing in a distant foreign country, and for a long time the prescription of subjects scarcely taught at all in India, made this a mere theoretical privilege of no practical advantage whatever. The legal equality of opportunity was delusive. In vain was it pointed out in the House of Commons that so fallacious a system would be felt as a bitter grievance. The contrary argument, that an English administration must be controlled and directed by men of English birth or at least of English training was generally felt to be valid. Indeed, it was valid. But it should have been secured by some means which did not offer a privilege to Indians with one hand and snatch it away with the other.

In this matter a fundamental difficulty lay in the immeasurable differences between Hindu and English

societies. • The average Englishman who sat for the Indian Civil Service examination probably had brothers in the army, probably was fond of riding and shooting, when he got to India would play polo and go on *shikar*. Though no soldier, he would usually have in him the makings of a good soldier, as Alfred Lyall proved in the Mutiny. But this attitude towards life was vastly different from that of the Hindu literate castes which alone produced candidates capable of competing successfully with him in an examination. They cared nothing for sport; they were inactive, sedentary; between them and the soldiers of India lay a deep gulf of mutual contempt. There was, in fact, little in common between them and the picked products of English Public Schools who filled the Indian Civil Service in the second half of the nineteenth century. Could the young English civil servant have met young Brahmans of his own age on equal terms pig-sticking or snipe-shooting, he would have been ready enough to set their unfamiliar intonation and odd locutions against his own solecisms in vernacular speech, and to form friendships of real and lasting nature. But the only Indians whom he met in these conditions were men who had never set foot inside a college. With the hasty, intolerant judgment of the young, he usually concluded that the educated Indian was useful on an office-stool but of uncertain value elsewhere; and early prejudices naturally cling through life. In this respect India suffered for her antediluvian social system. It was caste tradition, not inherent qualities, that made the men of certain castes seem spiritless, inactive, unsportsmanlike. Perhaps we ought to reckon the movement that began in the late 'eighties to develop in Indian colleges manly games, cricket, hockey, football, as by no means the least valuable intrusion of English notions into the Indian world. Our Public Schools may attach too much importance to athletics; but India has never attached enough, and tradition among the literate

castes concentrated irrationally on a purely mental development.

But however easily prejudices against the educated class of Indians may be explained, its exclusion from responsible office was a serious factor. As one of them said, "The Queen's proclamation of 1858 had stirred their ambitions in this direction." "And it is our further will," the Queen had declared, "that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge." Lord Derby, in drafting this passage, doubtless thought that the limitations were sufficient to prevent the disappointment of any but wildly exaggerated hopes. Yet every man who has ever had a post in his gift must know how seldom an applicant's estimate of his qualifications agrees with the opinions which other people form. Various suggestions were made in order to facilitate the appointment of Indians to the higher offices of government. Lawrence proposed to send specially selected men to England with scholarships. An Act was passed enabling the government to make rules under which Indians might be appointed to offices reserved for the Indian Civil Service. Lytton actually framed rules by which he hoped to form a service parallel to the Indian Civil Service, composed of the younger sons of Indian grandees. But this experiment came to nothing, for the candidates who were suitable by birth were seldom suitable by education. At last a temporary solution was found by permitting a specific number of posts previously filled by Indian Civil Servants to be occupied by Indians who had distinguished themselves in subordinate offices. But this expedient left the main grievance scarcely touched, and educated Indians continued to complain that they were not "freely and impartially admitted to office."

The case was much the same with the much more delicate matter of introducing popular elements into the structure of the autocracy. The appointment of Indians to this office or that did not affect the nature of the administration. "It was not enough," wrote an Indian leader, "that we should have our full share of the higher offices; but we aspired to have a voice in the Councils of the nation. . . . We looked forward to controlling [the bureaucracy], shaping and guiding its measures, and eventually bringing the entire administration under complete popular domination." The problem which confronted the government was how to give Indians a share in guiding policy without enabling hostile individuals to bring about a deadlock.

One of the earliest steps taken after the Mutiny had been to make an opening by which Indian gentlemen could be introduced into the Legislative Council. Down to 1853 the legislature and the executive government had been virtually identical. The same group of men discussed and decided questions of policy and ordained what law was to be enforced in the courts of justice. A short-lived experiment had been made in 1853 with the object of securing more diversified legal and practical knowledge than was possessed by the Governor-General and his Council. But it had worked in an unexpected manner, and had deprived the executive government of that absolute control over legislation which the executive had formerly enjoyed. In 1861, therefore, the experiment was abandoned. The old position was restored by a statute which ensured that the Governor-General should be able to pass through the legislature any bill he considered necessary. But at the same time he was authorized to nominate as additional members a small number of persons not holding any official post, and these always included a proportion of Indians. At the same time the legislature, which had been concentrated in the hands of the Governor-General and Council, was

expanded by setting up similar but subordinate bodies in the principal provinces.

This plan was open to the same objection as much else that was done about this period. Its essence lay in appearing to invest the new legislatures with real legislative power, while in fact it restored legislative authority to the executive. It said one thing and did another. It was therefore of a piece with the policy of formally confirming every treaty with the Indian states without any intention of acting upon such clauses as had lost their efficacy, or with the policy of appearing to offer to Indians equal opportunities with Englishmen of competing for the Indian Civil Service, when in fact the opportunities were not equal. Moreover, in the new legislature that harmonious co-operation between Indians and Englishmen on which the success of the Company had largely rested was (unintentionally of course) made more difficult. The officials sitting on the council were not free agents, they must all vote one way; they were henchmen of the government. Consequently, when any difference of opinion arose over a bill supported by government, the official *bloc* would solidly vote down Indian opinion. The system generated a habitual division of the Council not on rational but on racial lines.

Thirty years later a further small change was made in the Indian legislatures. Until 1893 the additional members had all been nominated by the executive. But now an experiment was made by way of introducing elective methods. It was resolved that persons recommended to the executive by various organized bodies should be nominated, so that in future Indians themselves should have a say in the selection of the Indian members. The main difficulty which had arisen in the choice of Indian legislators had lain in the fact that the men who possessed any practical experience of administrative work—such as the great zamindars—seldom knew enough English to take an effective part

small; and the educated middle-class too frequently considered it beneath their dignity to play an active part. One great element of weakness lay in the fact that Ripon shrank from applying to India an important feature of local self-government in England. Here office carries with it financial responsibility. The men who neglect to levy their rates or who misapply them when levied are individually and collectively responsible. But in India this valuable safeguard was never introduced. Perhaps it was thought that Indians could not easily be induced to accept such a responsibility. Many perhaps would have refused. But those who were willing to shoulder responsibility would probably have proved more active and disinterested.

Meanwhile a movement designed to prove the fitness of India for self-government had long been in progress. From the first the intellectual activity arising out of English education had exhibited itself not merely in journalism and pamphleteering, but in the formation of literary and debating societies. They go back at least as early as 1831, when we find Hindu students at Calcutta forming an *Athenæum*. The objects of this and similar clubs were in the main literary, religious, or academic, not political. But the British Indian Association, which was established in Bengal in 1851, had more practical purposes. It was designed to protect the interests of the Bengal zamindars, who thought that they perceived in various government proposals an inclination to undermine their privileged position. A group of English Radicals had played some part in the events leading up to this development; and it is both curious and instructive to find that party allied with a body of landlords more conservative in spirit than any last-ditcher in the House of Lords. The phenomenon recurs at later periods, and marks what queer alliances are produced by politics.

The Association held meetings, listened to speeches, adopted resolutions, and on occasion petitioned Parliament. Other associations, in which the educated middle class rather than the zamindars were concerned, appeared later on with more specifically political purposes—the extension of Indian employment under the government and the modification of the government itself. These were all local or at most provincial organizations, and for a long time efforts to extend them were defeated by provincial particularism. When a Bengali leader toured the country, hoping to arouse a widespread movement of protest against a change in the Indian Civil Service examination conditions, he was met with decided suspicion and mistrust. But with time the provincial jealousies within this special class began to weaken, and in 1885 an opportunity occurred which was exploited to the full.

A bill was introduced into the Governor-General's Legislative Council designed to end the anomaly which prevented an Indian member of the Indian Civil Service, if appointed district judge, from hearing criminal suits in which an Englishman was involved. The English community at Calcutta made this the pretext for a violent, unreasonable and ill-considered agitation. The kind of argument put forward was obviously based on an assumption that an Indian might be good enough to administer justice to other Indians but not to Englishmen. This general imputation was strongly, generally, resented; and as a consequence suggestions for an endeavour to form a central body which should link up all the political associations of the country met with approval in many different places. So the Ilbert Bill Agitation, as it was called from the bill which gave rise to it, provided the occasion for the educated middle class to realize its unity. In 1885 the Indian National Congress, embracing men from every Indian province, met at Poona.

The National Congress was intended to demonstrate that India was ripe for self-government. Its leaders hoped by the temper and quality of its debates, by the force of their arguments, by the universal following which they expected to attract, to prove to England that representative and responsible governments ought to be established at Calcutta and at the head-quarters of each of the chief provinces, on the model of the self-governing colonies. This was, however, a very difficult course to follow, demanding the most skilled and determined guidance. It was necessary to select for discussion only such subjects as would rally to the Congress an ever-increasing number of followers, and to deal with them in such a way as to impress English political circles; and the two objects were to a considerable degree mutually destructive, for sound and moderate argument was not provocative of enthusiasm. Still more difficult was it for the Congress to stand forward as the representative champion of a united India. The movement which brought it into being was obviously sectional in character. The professional middle class had become acutely conscious of its common interests, but that feeling was not shared by those outside its narrow limits. It was essentially Hindu, for the Muslims had sullenly refused to participate in the educational activities of the government; and although a small number of Muslims attended the Congress, their attendance was reprobated by the great majority of their fellows. It is true that occasionally the Congress made a gesture of amity to the Muslims by nominating one of their community to be chairman. But this was a gesture only, designed to impress the outside world and void of real significance. Its emptiness was strikingly revealed in connection with one of the questions to which the Congress applied itself most assiduously. It was eager to see the examination for admission to the Indian Civil Service held simultaneously in London and in

India, in the belief that this would lead to the appointment of an increasing number of Indians. In that they were probably justified. But the Muslims as a whole strongly opposed the plan. They said with truth that the change might benefit the Hindus but not themselves; and their leader, Sir Saiyid Ahmad, bluntly declared that his community, if it competed at all, would compete with the pen with which it had inscribed the scroll of empire.

Nor were the Muslims the only large section of Indians for whom the Congress could not speak. It was not merely a Hindu movement, but also one involving a small group of castes of a high status in the Hindu world. It was predominantly Brahman. It was not easy for Western men to believe that those who claimed to be immeasurably superior to all others, who could not eat with others without pollution, who endeavoured to prevent low-caste children from attending public schools and who would not if they could help it admit a low-caste witness into a court of justice, could really believe in the democratic principles which they professed. The suspicion thus generated was not removed by the Congress's attitude to the question of social reform. The abolition of many customs prevalent among high caste Hindus was quite as urgent, perhaps more urgent, for the good of the country as any political reforms whatever. There had been a strong desire among many of the educated middle-class to bring social reforms into prominence. But as the Congress Movement became more definitely political, the question of social reform was allowed to sink into the background, and the majority of those attending it were much more disposed to defend unregenerate Hinduism than to follow the hard and unpopular course of advocating and supporting its reformation.

Of the practices most loudly calling for change was that of encouraging the consummation of marriage as soon as the girl had given signs of maturity. At Calcutta

a case of singular barbarity occurred, leading to the death of the child-wife and the prosecution of her husband for culpable homicide. In consequence a bill was introduced into the Legislative Council in 1891 to prohibit cohabitation before a wife was twelve years old. As had happened two generations earlier when Bentinck prohibited Suttee, the Hindus of Calcutta declared religion to be in danger and the Brahman press denounced the bill.

Until this time the Congress had been a highly decorous body, annually declaring that India owed her recovery from chaos to British government, and urging constitutional changes with a growing degree of acerbity but still with moderate language. But in 1891 a new element appeared. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a Poona Brahman, stood forward as the champion of the Bengali cause. He was a man of great vigour and ability. He was a member of the same Brahman sub-caste as had produced the men who in the eighteenth century had built up the Maratha power. An earnest student of Sanskrit, but inspired at the same time with the Western interest in history and politics, he had built up a theory, honestly or not is difficult to judge, that all the evils from which India had suffered were to be ascribed to the villainy of her foreign invaders, by whom he meant the Muslims and the English. He had always disapproved of social reform, in part because he professed to regard Hindu society as the most perfect imaginable, in part because he judged that until the Congress allied itself with Hindu orthodoxy it could never command a popular following. In his Marathi newspaper, the *Kesari*, he launched a campaign against the government far more bitter than any that had preceded it, and at the same time did his utmost to convert the Congress to his views.

In the Congress for the moment he was foiled. He met with steady opposition from a group of leaders who stood firmly for constitutional methods and had no wish

to break the connection between India and Great Britain. The principal of these was Tilak's fellow-casteman, Gokhale, a man less incisive of speech, but at least Tilak's equal in courage and with far higher qualities of statesmanship. Defeated in the Congress, however, Tilak pursued his efforts outside. When the Age of Consent Bill had been used up as a text for his invective, he set to work to revive the old antagonism of Hindu and Muslim in the Maratha country. He set going a movement to repair the tomb of Sivaji, the great king who had united the Marathas against the Mughals, and instituted a festival in his honour. Famine and bubonic plague attacked Western India in 1896, and created an atmosphere of suffering and alarm. In its efforts to stay the plague, the Bombay Government had ordered all houses in infected areas to be examined so that the sufferers could be isolated. These measures were in themselves intensely unpopular. Tilak eagerly fanned these embers of discontent. He accused the search-parties of constant outrages, and denounced the Government as deliberately oppressing the people. At the same time he put forward suggestions likely to lead to violence. One of his articles pictured Sivaji mourning over the degeneracy of his people who would not strike a blow for themselves. Another applauded the conduct of his hero in treacherously assassinating a Muslim general. His moral was the familiar one, that the end justifies the means. He thus succeeded in bringing about the murder of the Plague Commissioner and an officer accompanying him by a youth of Tilak's own caste. The prediction of Elphinstone in 1831 was thus being fulfilled. "We shall have," he said, "to contend at once with the more refined theories of Europe, and with the prejudices and fanaticism of Asia, both rendered doubly formidable by the imperfect education of those to whom every appeal will be addressed."

This movement in the Maratha country was definitely

checked by the capture and execution of the murderer and his accomplices and by Tilak's imprisonment after a prolonged trial. Its main importance lies in two things. One was the introduction into India of political crime. Tilak had coldly and shrewdly calculated that a few murders would call more attention to the Congress demands for political reform than all the orations and resolutions of the Congress put together. The other aspect of importance was the open avowal that Hindu and Muslim remained enemies. The Muslim attitude regarding simultaneous Civil Service examinations had been much resented, but most Hindu leaders had sought to disguise their feelings in pursuit of that concealment of differences which was the best substitute for real unity they could produce. Tilak scorned that subterfuge at least, and made no concealment of his hatred of his Muslim countrymen. He thus not only gave the Hindu political movement a strong impulse to a policy of violence but also aided as strongly as he could the revival of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, destined to be a marked feature of the next thirty years. His attitude in this matter shows clearly the difficulties in which the Hindu leaders found themselves. So long as they claimed to speak only for their own restricted class they would be met with the jibe that they "represented nothing but their own anomaly." The endeavour, by a careful balance, to hide the deep-seated differences of the Indian communities, was too transparent to deceive any but the simplest-minded. As Tilak seems to have judged the situation, the Congress could only attain power by securing a large following, and it could do that only by winning over the orthodox Hindu world. Hence his antagonism to all social reform, and hence his endeavour to overwhelm Briton and Muslim alike in one common wave of Hindu hatred.

The development of political crime marks a further stage in the contacts established between India and the

West. There could be no reason why Hindu absorption of Western political ideas should stop short of anarchism. No direct connection, literary or otherwise, seems to have been developed with Russian Nihilism; but indirect relations by way of Paris were established. A graduate of Balliol named Krishna Varma in 1905 founded the India Home Rule Society in London. He and his friends set up a journal, the *Indian Sociologist*, preaching the value of murder, and formed a secret society to teach the art of making bombs. This was linked up with another secret society at Nasik, in the Bombay Presidency; and the two societies produced two murders, one in London and the other in Nasik, after which Krishna Varma retreated to Paris, whence he continued his propaganda.

From these centres the movement extended to Bengal. The news of Tilak's imprisonment had been greeted with tearful rhetoric by Bengali leaders, and in 1905 the Partition of Bengal became the occasion for a wild agitation in that province. Curzon, impressed by the difficulty of administering Bengal from a single centre, and by the physical and religious differences between its western and eastern areas, had formed Eastern Bengal, with a predominantly Muslim population, into a separate province with a lieutenant-governor of its own. This was attacked for a variety of reasons. The lawyers and journalists of Calcutta feared lest the establishment of a new capital would injure their interests. Politicians, infected by Tilak's views, feared or pretended to fear that a Hindu minority would be ground under the Muslim heel. A boycott of English goods was organized. Demonstrations were held. Schoolboys were taught that their mother-land was being carved in pieces. Under cover of this excitement a group headed by Arabindo Ghose renewed efforts which at an earlier time had met with a lukewarm reception; and this time they succeeded.

In many ways Bengal of all the provinces of British India was the best-prepared region for this political

development. The number of graduates who could hardly earn a living was great : the number of inefficient schools with miserably-paid teachers was great : the number of boys who found their hopes blighted by being unable to pass university examinations was extraordinarily great. This unhappy and discontented mass was made unhappier and worse off by the general rise in the level of prices that was going on all over the world. Their imagination was kindled by the news of the Japanese victories by land and sea over the Russians. For the first time since 1683, when the Turks had been driven in rout from under the walls of Vienna, had an Asiatic race secured a real and unquestionable military success over Europeans. On the top of this came the excitement of the Partition Agitation. Nor did there exist in the province as delicate machinery as elsewhere to record changes of condition and sentiment, and to keep the administration in touch with what was going forward.

Amid these favourable circumstances the Terrorist movement waxed apace. Imaginative, sensitive, emotional, the Bengali students rallied in large numbers to a service which they were taught to regard as patriotic. Here again the Press played a large part. Pamphlets such as Arabindo Ghose's *Temple of Kali* and journals such as the *New Era* and *Hail Mother* preached the murder of the English foreigner as a religious duty, and urged that a combined effort could rid the country of their domination in a single day. Kali-worship became the outward badge of the Bengali Terrorist creed. Kali, in Hindu mythology, was created by the gods to destroy the demons who had usurped their kingdom. She was also the Mother Goddess, last survivor of a primitive cult which once spread over vast tracts of the ancient world. She delighted in sacrifices. Her temples ran with the blood of goats, and had run with the blood of human sacrifices. She was, therefore, a suitable patron for the young Terrorists. Under her auspices they tried to blow

up the train in which the lieutenant-governor was travelling, slaughtered two English women in mistake for an English magistrate, and murdered four men actively concerned in the prosecutions which followed.

In 1907, therefore, the position was difficult. In India the party of discontent and disaffection was prominent. Very little had been done to meet legitimate grievances, and even less to arm the Government against the growing menace of Hindu extremists. At home the government of Mr. Asquith was in power ; and the Prime Minister, despite his great gifts, his charm of manner, his eloquence of speech, was so mistrustful of his countrymen's good sense and strong hearts that he always preferred to hide ugly facts with smooth words. He will, I think, be remembered in history as the man who, knowing well that war was about to break upon Europe, would not make such preparations as might have prevented that calamity. If India was going to be handled in the same manner as Ireland, the future was black indeed.

The Governor-General was Lord Minto, who had succeeded Lord Curzon in 1905. He was a man of great tact and sagacity, and found himself yoked with John Morley, Secretary of State in Asquith's government. Few men have been more dissimilar—Morley all doctrine and theory, Minto all experience and understanding. Morley longed for India to be governed with all the restrictions and forms which were observed in England, provided that he, as Secretary of State, should be allowed to fill the rôle of benevolent despot. Minto was wholly unmoved by theoretical considerations. Two things seemed to him too clear for question. One was that the Terrorists must be put down : the other that the time was ripe and over-ripe for the remedy of substantial grievances. He was completely convinced that the two must go together. Morley, on the contrary, would have been satisfied with mere constitutional reforms, as if they

would have stilled the discontent of Indian^{*} graduates with nothing to do but prey upon their fellows.

A number of points were common to both. Each thought that the Legislative Councils should be enlarged; that the elective principle should be definitely established; that their powers should be increased to enable them to adopt resolutions on matters of executive policy; that they should be allowed to discuss the annual budget instead of merely having it expounded to them. But there the two men parted company. Morley, despite his public and private disclaimers, viewed this movement in the direction of representative institutions as the root of the matter. Minto regarded it as inevitable but insignificant. It was "a sop to impossible ambitions." Other matters bulked much larger in his eyes. It was of essential importance, he thought, to rally to the side of government the moderates, who felt that their attitude had not received due recognition and who were wondering if they would not have done better to side with Tilak and the extremists. Minto was soon convinced that the best way of regaining their confidence was to show his trust in them, and that the strongest mark of trust would be the appointment of Indians to the highest executive office, namely to seats on the executive councils. Nothing could prove more clearly the abandonment of that caste-character which had marked the Anglo-Indian government from the time of Cornwallis. He pursued this purpose, steadily, tactfully, obstinately. Morley liked the idea, but not enough to run any risks to secure it. The Asquith Cabinet considered it, but resolved against it until it was clear that Minto's administration, his firmness in suppressing violence and his caution regarding reforms, had won such general confidence that an explosion on the part of back-benchers was unlikely. Then the proposal was accepted. Morley at once appointed Indian members to the Council of India; an Indian lawyer, afterwards Lord Sinha and first Indian governor of a British-Indian

province, was appointed to Minto's executive council; and the presidency executive councils were enlarged to permit the appointment of Indians to them also.

The second point on which Minto laid the chief emphasis was in the matter of representation. Under the tentative scheme adopted in 1893 the legislative members appointed on the nomination of public bodies had been mainly lawyers and almost exclusively members of the professional middle-class. This was a very natural development. But it was very one-sided. Minto felt that the Government ought to hear the opinions of many other Indian classes. After all, India was an agricultural country, and the views of the agricultural interest ought to be voiced and considered. The mercantile community might well claim a share in the guidance of public policy. The Muslims were already complaining that past arrangements had left them unrepresented. Accordingly, Minto sought to secure the inclusion of these sections of the Indian peoples in the reconstituted councils and here, too, he succeeded. By the device of special constituencies he secured the return, alike on the central and on the provincial legislatures, of men who could, to some extent at all events, express the views and wishes of the major classes and interests in India. At the same time he left the educated middle-class in possession of the representation which it already enjoyed.

Collectively, these changes made up what are usually called the Morley-Minto Reforms, introduced by the Statute of 1909. They were accompanied and followed by executive action, and by legislation designed to arm the government against the Terrorist movement. One weapon which for a time Minto used with comparative freedom was the power long possessed by the Indian government of deporting undesirable persons. A number of persons believed to be the heads of the terrorists were arrested and kept in detention. Morley could scarcely bear this action, and in season and out of season kept

pressing Minto to release them. The Governor-General, however, refused to be hurried. He secured the passing of Acts making the unauthorized possession of explosives a criminal offence, and enabling the Government to require the owners of a Press guilty of publishing seditious matter to give bonds for good behaviour, and permitting the forfeiture not only of the bonds but also of the presses themselves if the offence was repeated. Having thus rendered incitement to crime not only criminal but also costly, Minto then released the deportees.

He had, indeed, guided the government round a nasty corner. His conduct infused new heart into the moderate Indian politicians, who warmly appreciated his attitude towards the increased and higher employment of Indians in the government. They set themselves to use the powers granted to the new legislative councils, and could soon point to many modifications of government policy made on their initiative.

The main criticism, both at the time and afterwards, directed against the Morley-Minto Reforms attacked the settlement made with the Muslims and the provision of special Muslim electorates. It was argued that the measure was bad, because it would tend to perpetuate the differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities; and it has since been pointed at as the source of those communal difficulties which characterized the period that followed. It is possible that the first argument is partly true. But as against this we must remember that the differences between the two were so deep, so long standing, that no settlement which ignored them could have been satisfactory, and any settlement which recognized them would have been accused of perpetuating them. The second argument has, I think, no element of truth about it. Its authors forget that the Hindu-Muslim question is quiescent when there is no uncertainty about the political position. So long as the Muslims exercised power, in the well-established Maratha

states, under the British autocracy, communal difficulties, though ever latent, could not break out into open conflict. They arise whenever the future control of power looks uncertain. They arose, for instance, when the Mughal Empire was decaying under Aurangzib. They were certain to revive as soon as the British autocracy was seen to be preparing to divest itself of power. If any man can be accused of creating this source of weakness in modern times, Tilak is much guiltier than Minto. But, indeed, Tilak himself in this matter was the victim of circumstances, the heir of that political division which a long-distant past had imposed upon the country.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR AND THE DYARCHIC EXPERIMENT

MINTO, it may be remembered, had regarded the constitutional part of his reforms as "a sop to impossible ambitions." In forming that opinion he was assuredly not inspired by any ill will. The man who opened his executive council to Indians can scarcely be accused of that. But he had learnt to see clearly how great were the obstacles lying in the path of representative government in India, and how far asunder Indian conditions were from those existing in England or in any of the self-governing dominions. Later developments were to prove the accuracy of his general judgment, for every step taken towards representative government has made those difficulties loom higher and higher, although, after all, it may well be that they are not insurmountable.

The introduction of the Morley-Minto reforms was followed by an evident easing of the political tension. Sporadic terrorism persisted ; but the Partition Agitation in Bengal evoked no enthusiasm elsewhere and was obviously waning. In 1912 King George visited India in order to crown himself King-Emperor at the ancient capital of Delhi. This visit was in itself a land-mark not only in the history of British India but also in that of India itself. Queen Victoria and King Edward VII had in turn been proclaimed, the first Empress, the second Emperor, of India at durbars of great magnificence. King George V did not depute his formal assumption of

the Indian crown to his Viceroy, but came in person to assume it. He was thus marking clearly and decisively that India was no chance adjunct to his dominions. He was, moreover, the first emperor in Indian history who could claim authority from end to end of India. The dream of universal dominion which had haunted the minds of Maurya and Gupta sovereigns, of Muslim sultan and emperor, had been realized. No part of India was unrepresented in the great assemblage which did obeisance to the king. Nor is it possible to mistake the significance of the announcements which King George made in person. He had, as Prince of Wales after an earlier visit, urged upon the English world the need of approaching Indian questions with sympathy. He now declared that in future soldiers of the Indian Army would be eligible for the Victoria Cross ; that large grants were to be made for the promotion of popular education , and that the capital of India was to be transferred from Calcutta to Delhi, the most famous of all the old capitals of India. This last announcement took the world by surprise. Not a whisper of the decision had reached the outer world, and in some respects it was perhaps open to challenge. Indeed, no Englishman could see without regret the abandonment, as the centre of the Indian empire, of that proud city on the Hugli, one of the wealthiest and greatest in the world, built up and defended by British blood and energy, and full of memories of the days of Clive and Hastings when the outcome of British adventure in India was still uncertain. The transference of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi did mean the end of a chapter in the history of British India. It was related to that decision of Minto's to open to Indians the executive councils. It meant the coming end of that all-British government which, as I have said elsewhere, had suppressed internal wars, reorganized the administration, and, by the precept of education and the example of high ideals, had given new

life to a country exhausted and demoralized by the collapse of its government and the conflicts of its people.

But the war of 1914 followed swiftly on this opening of a new period. The temper with which that catastrophe was met proved how well-timed Minto's reforms had been. Apart from a small number of irreconcilables, no one wished to see the British Empire fall. The Legislative Council, by passing the Defence of India Act, entrusted the Government with extraordinary powers similar to those granted by Parliament to the Government here ; and, following the notable example of the Calcutta citizens in the time of the Napoleonic Wars, Indians voted as a free gift a contribution to the costs of the war against Germany. The Indian Princes were eager with their offers of State troops. The Indian Army was called upon to make exertions for which its organization had never been designed. In the early months of the war it contributed to the defence of France against the German onrush. It undertook the task of driving the Turks out of Mesopotamia. It fought in Persia, in Palestine, in East Africa. In India itself all possible sources of making munitions were mobilized ; hospital ships were equipped ; and heavy demands made on the population for both military recruits and labour corps. Almost all the units of the regular English Army were withdrawn, and their places taken by territorials and the local Defence Force. The Government of India, engrossed with these multifarious activities, and with the task of watching closely the efforts of both disaffected leaders and foreign agents, found small time either to keep in close touch with the movement of Indian sentiment or to guide and maintain the enthusiasm with which the Allied cause had at first been greeted. In the large cities, as year after year passed away, with no decided and unquestionable success in Europe, war-weariness took the place of enthusiasm, and men's minds turned rather to what was

to happen when the war was over than to the means by which an early victory might be secured.

This inclination was greatly strengthened by the Russian Revolution, and the new ideas which some of the Russian leaders were said to champion. This was the more natural in that broad similarities existed between Russia and India. Both were vast countries of countless villages. Both were agricultural. Both were backward in economic development. Both were governed autocratically. Both possessed classes of intelligentsia who had no political influence. In each the ruler had given signs of a desire to broaden the basis of his power. Just as the Russo-Japanese War, a few years earlier, had produced a considerable repercussion in India, so now the collapse of the Tsarist Government excited the hopes of the Extremists that a like fate might be awaiting the Government of India. Tilak was still alive, and still cherishing the same hopes as had inspired his earlier onslaughts against British power in India—namely, the establishment of Brahman rule. He found a notable ally in the person of Mrs. Besant, the leader of the Theosophical Movement. That movement had always been a curious mixture of sincerity and sham, although, to tell the truth, the sincerity had been exhibited in the main by its humble followers. In its early days theosophy had been distinguished, not only by its fraudulent claims to miraculous powers, but also by its fanciful glorification of the ages when Hindus and Hinduism had been supreme in India. It had sent out missionaries and lecturers who had painted in the most glowing colours that conception of early India which must have been revealed to them by supernatural agency, for assuredly it could not have been drawn from any historical source. In this respect the Theosophical Society had anticipated the doctrine which Tilak preached. But till 1916 it had never taken any ostensible part in politics. Mrs. Besant then began a campaign which she labelled the Home Rule Movement,

a title which was apparently intended to draw attention to contemporary events in Ireland. She produced a journal, *New India*, and other publications, describing the Congress movement in terms which implied that its leaders had undergone a persecution comparable with that of the early Christians at Romé. Presently, having forfeited the security for the conduct of her press, she was interned, under the Defence of India Act, in the pleasant seclusion of the Nilgiri Hills. Thereon Tilak had taken up the word, and was roundly declaring that the sole purpose of the British Government was to keep Indians in perpetual slavery.

Meanwhile the events of the war had produced an unprecedented Muslim movement. They had involved Great Britain in a war with the Sultan of Turkey, whom, since the disappearance of the Mughal Empire, all Indian Muslims had regarded as their Caliph. The war in Mesopotamia and the rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca had severely tried Muslim patience, and had led to the misconduct of Indian Muslim troops, perhaps imprudently employed against the Sultan. The general body of Muslims was alarmed, uneasy and divided. In such circumstances the men of extreme views easily came to the top, and joined in with the Hindu Home Rule Movement. For once in a way the communal hostility of Hindu and Muslim seemed to have given place to a common hostility of both against British rule.

At the same time there had been a marked recrudescence of revolutionary crime. Bengali terrorists were encouraged by agents in German pay. A revolutionary society, formed by the Panjabi Hardayal on the Pacific coast of the United States, began what was called the Ghadr (or Mutiny) Movement among the Sikhs, aiming especially at the mutiny of Sikh troops. A rising planned for February, 1915, had been concerted between the Ghadr Party and the Bengali revolutionists ; but this was betrayed to the government and the attempt

was checked ; but numerous gang robberies occurred in the Panjab, and a body of returning Sikh emigrants, inspired by Ghadr doctrine, caused a lively action in the neighbourhood of Calcutta. There would seem to have been moments when the government itself feared that some wide-spread movement might break out and dissolve all authority.

Such events, coupled with the lugubrious course of the war in Europe, determined the English cabinet to make such a pronouncement on Indian policy as would reassure moderate opinion and relieve the tension which seemed to be daily growing more severe. On 20th August, 1917, the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Edwin Montagu, read the following statement in the House of Commons :—

“The policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty’s Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty’s approval, that I should accept the Viceroy’s invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others.

“I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance,

and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility."

The report issued in 1918 over the signatures of Mr. Montagu and the Governor-General, Lord Chelmsford, observes: "We take these words to be the most momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered history." It is usual for men to claim for their own views and achievements a value far greater than posterity is commonly willing to admit; and not infrequently we resort to the device of depreciating what has been done by our predecessors in order to enhance the importance of our own policy and actions. The report which I have just quoted and the events which it purports to review, mark in reality one more in a long series of experiments; and indeed the reforms sponsored by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were scarcely more important in their position in the sequence and certainly less successful in regard to the circumstances of the time, than the Morley-Minto Reforms which Mr. Montagu was not unwilling to belittle.

Out of the discussions provoked by the unrest manifested in India three main schemes for modifying the government had been developed. One was a scheme put forward jointly by the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. The main proposal consisted in establishing in each province a popularly elected legislative council, with an executive government consisting of an English Governor and councillors consisting half of persons nominated by the Governor, half of persons elected by the legislative council. The proposals also included the retention of special Muslim constituencies, and a further provision for the safeguard of Muslim interests, namely that no bill affecting a religious community should be proceeded with if opposed

by three-quarters of the members representing that community in the legislature. Revenues³ should be raised by annual votes of the legislative council.

This scheme was evidently based on the plan of moving towards the ideal of representative government. Another scheme, formulated by members of the administration and sponsored at a later date by the heads of provinces, approached the problem from the opposite standpoint. The principal difficulty in the path of advance, they argued, lay in the lack of Indian politicians familiar with the practical business of administration. The legislative councils were full of non-official Indians, well versed in criticizing the policy and proposals of the government; but they included no non-officials with personal knowledge of the difficulties besetting the formulation of a policy. The first necessity lay in training the ministers of the future, and it was therefore proposed that, in the first instance, no change should be made in the composition and powers of the legislative councils, but that the head of the province should have power to nominate from the legislature an additional number of councillors who would act with him like any other executive councillors.

The third was an ingenious plan, first struck out by an Indian civil servant, Sir William Duke, and elaborated in discussions with other members of the service and with members of the Round Table Group which had figured prominently in the formation of a constitution for the Union of South Africa. Since it was not practicable all at once to substitute for the existing administration a system of full representative and responsible government, why should not the transfer of authority be conducted piece-meal? A number of departments, it was urged, might be entrusted to ministers chosen from and responsible to the legislative councils, while the rest of the work of government would be carried on as before.

Mr. Montagu did not like the Congress-League

proposals, and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report has some shrewd criticisms to offer upon them. "We find in these proposals (it says) no connecting-rod between the executive and legislative wheels of the machine which will ensure that they will work in unison." There was no provision by which a new government could be formed if disputes or even serious differences of opinion arose between the existing government and the legislative chamber. Experience had proved the liability of the official world with its natural emphasis on the need for good order and efficiency as the prime consideration of government, to reach conclusions totally different from those formulated by non-official Indians, inspired by theories of politics rather than by experience of administration. Various parts of the British Empire had at one time or another attempted to work such a system, but it had never succeeded. "An executive," the Report justly said, "which is independent of its legislature, as the Indian executives have hitherto been, can carry on the government in virtue of authority derived from without; a party executive can govern because it interprets the will of the people as represented by the assembly; but wherever, as in Canada or Malta, attempts have been made to set up an irremovable executive and a popular assembly, acute conflict has ensued, and has resulted in either an advance to popular government or a return to autocracy."

Equally objectionable, both in theory and practice, was the proposal, in the Congress-League Scheme, that the executive government should be bound to carry out such recommendations of the legislative councils as were embodied in resolutions. In the minds of its proposers, this seemed no more than an extension of the provision already in force under the Morley-Minto reforms, enabling the councils to adopt resolutions on matters of executive action. It was, moreover, characteristic of the tendency exhibited by non-officials in municipal

administration, where they had often endeavoured to control matters of detail by resolution. But if this plan of government were to be applied in wider areas and more important matters, the results might easily turn out to be disastrous. Resolutions adopted by a council might prove completely unworkable in practice, owing to some oversight or ignorance in the way in which they were worded. But what was more important still was the fact that such a method might "bring government to an end by destroying its right of action." An executive government cannot remain in office to carry out a policy of which it disapproves and it cannot be held responsible for action forced upon it. "If it is to be held responsible for government, it must govern; and if it is not to govern, it must give way to those who can." Conflicts over legislation could not be more than intermittent; but conflicts over executive matters might well be incessant, if the councils were given the power of binding the executive by resolution without the power of changing one government for another. In fact, the League-Congress Scheme might easily have been so worked as to involve either the complete suspension of the legislative councils or the effective establishment of responsible government which its authors did not ostensibly demand.

For these reasons, admirably expressed in the report, and in themselves unanswerable, the Congress-League Scheme was ruled out as impracticable. No such objections could be brought against the proposals generally called the Heads of Provinces Scheme. But it was disliked on the ground that it involved merely an extension and development of the Minto policy, which the Secretary of State considered to be already out of date and at any rate avoiding any of those constitutional changes implicit in the Declaration of 1917. He himself had already made up his mind in favour of the more dubious but spectacular plan of attempting to divide the functions of government and handing it over to

democratic control by departments—the plan which later became familiar under the name of Dyarchy.

Full of eagerness to carry this plan into effect, Mr. Montagu visited India at the close of 1917. He hoped that he would be able to instil his intentions into the minds of the principal people, official and non-official, so that the plan should seem to represent the united wishes of India, or at worst the deliberate proposals of the Indian Government. But in this he was sorely mistaken. His diary, which has since been published, exhibits him tired and irritable with the effects of the war, and attempting to hurry everyone into a plan of which most men disapproved. The task which he had undertaken was therefore difficult, and the diary lavishes contemptuous phrases on all who differed from him. On the other hand the whole Anglo-Indian world hummed with stories to the disadvantage of the Secretary of State, who after all was not much more than an amateur in Indian affairs. They blamed the policy of English politicians for the difficulties which had grown up, while Mr. Montagu was at one time or another persuaded that not a man in India but himself could see a foot in front of him.

The discussions proceeded therefore amid an atmosphere of anger and mistrust. The plan had been for Mr. Montagu to tour India, conferring with the various governments and the leaders of Indian opinion; and in the idle hope of restoring calm the Secretary of State had insisted on the release of political *détenus*. In the course of the visit, which ended in May, 1918, the plan for dyarchy was elaborated and expounded in a report, actually written by Sir William Marris, and which was at last signed by the Government of India.

The basis of the plan lay in the ingenious idea of establishing responsible government in the provinces by departments. Provincial business was to be divided into two classes, reserved and transferred subjects. The former would continue to be managed in the same way

as in the presidencies, by a governor and executive council, which, the Report suggested, should in future consist of two members, one an English official, the other an Indian official or non-official as the governor thought best. Parallel with this would be a government composed of the governor and two or more ministers, chosen from the Legislative Assembly by the governor and appointed by him for the lifetime of the assembly. The ministers together with the governor would manage the transferred subjects, and it was intended that the ministers should enjoy all the liberty of action compatible with orderly and effective government. They would be bound to listen to the governor's advice, and in the last resort be subject to his control, but the positions of governor, ministers and assembly were to be intermediate between the autocratic system of the past and the responsible government of the future. "Our hope and intention is that the ministers will gladly avail themselves of the governor's trained advice upon administrative questions, while on his part he will be willing to meet their wishes to the furthest possible extent in cases where he realizes that they have the support of popular opinion." An endeavour was to be made to define this highly indefinite position in the Instrument of Instructions issued to the governors on their appointment by the Crown.

Although then Mr. Montagu did not propose to introduce responsible government even in regard to the transferred departments of the provincial governments, he thought there were two methods by which development towards responsible government might be secured. With the growth of experience on the part of the ministers and of the assemblies it was expected that the governor's position would become less one of control than one of advice. But this was not all. It was also hoped that the dual government would "present a united front" to the outer world by cultivating a habit of common

deliberation. Either half would almost always be able to offer useful advice to the other, although the final decision on a question and the responsibility for the action taken on it would rest with that half to which the question belonged. Moreover some questions, especially those of finance, could not but touch both sides of the administration, and it was evidently essential that the grounds for action in such cases should be fully discussed in common.

It was recognized that the limitations to be imposed on ministerial action and the influence of the legislative councils would be pointed to by Indian politicians as evidence of the little way which even Mr. Montagu went in compliance with Indian demands. The Report therefore dwelt upon the conditions which made full and immediate ministerial responsibility inexpedient if not impossible. "The legislative council," it observed, "has had no experience of the power of dismissing ministers or the results attending the exercise of such power. Nobody in India is yet familiar with the obligations imposed by tenure of office at the will of a legislative assembly. It is only by actual experience that these lessons can be learnt." Meanwhile, since a minister could only be reappointed to office after the demise of an assembly on condition of securing his re-election to that body, the scheme would in fact make an end of the conditions under which all power had been exercised without reference to any Indian popular control.

The novelty and complexity of the new proposals were duly recognized and stated. The unity of the executive government would be weakened, and the plan was constitutionally heterodox. But the gradual transfer of authority from an autocratic to a responsible government was a matter for which orthodox constitutions could make no provision. The duality of the executive could be minimized by the influence of "mutual forbearance and a strong common purpose." Moreover,

since all members of the executive would be appointed by the governor, they should not exhibit extreme diversities of opinion.

As regards the complex nature of the new scheme, it was justly observed that in such complicated conditions a simple solution was out of the question. The scheme was "experimental and transitional," designed to permit "the temporary co-ordination" of two different principles of government. "We were driven therefore first to devising some dualism in the executive; and secondly to providing such a balance of power between the two portions as would permit the one portion to grow without at the same time disabling the other from discharging its very necessary functions of preserving continuity and safeguarding essentials."

It was hoped that this dyarchic structure would permit and facilitate the gradual development of full responsible government in the provinces. "As the popular element in the government acquires experience and learns to discharge its duties efficiently, further powers should be entrusted to it." This would be secured by the gradual increase of the transferred and a corresponding decrease of the reserved subjects until the latter had altogether disappeared. Proposals were therefore made to allow of such modification where the transferred departments were well and efficiently managed; but if, on the contrary, the experiment worked ill, it should also be possible to hand back transferred subjects to the official administration. At the same time it would be possible, by making the ministers' salaries a transferred subject, and therefore voted annually by the legislative council, to establish full ministerial responsibility for the departments which were to be transferred.

Other changes were proposed which may be summarized briefly. The provincial councils were to be

enlarged; the system of indirect election swept away; the franchise extended to the farthest practicable point. As regards the Muslim electorates set up by Minto, the report devotes four paragraphs to criticizing them in principle, but concludes lamely with the remark, "But . . . we are bound to see that the community secures proper representation in the new councils." Therefore the Muslim constituencies "must be maintained until conditions alter." Similar treatment was recommended for the Sikh community. In the case of other minorities, nomination was suggested as the best method of securing representation. Thus even Mr. Montagu's ingenuity could find no way of circumventing one of the most embarrassing of all Indian political problems.

The proposed modifications in the central government, though extensive, were less fundamental. The Indian element in the executive council was to be increased. The Legislative Council was to be named the Legislative Assembly; the official majority was to be abolished; instead of twenty-seven elected members with a larger number of nominated members, there were to be a hundred of whom two-thirds were to be elected. And there was to be set up a second chamber, the Council of State, half of which would consist of officials, with representatives chosen by the provincial legislative councils and a small number of directly elected members. "We desire," the report ran, "that the Council of State should develop something of the experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen; and we suggest, therefore, that the Governor-General-in-Council should make regulations as to the qualification of candidates for election to that body which will ensure that their status, position, and record of services will give to the Council a senatorial character." Accompanying these proposals went a plan for gradually filling the superior services with Indian members and introducing Indian officers into the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army.

The constitutional scheme was embodied in the Government of India Act, 1919, and in rules made under it. By way of preventing deadlocks between the Legislative Assembly and the executive, the budget was classified into votable and non-votable heads, the latter of which could not even be discussed by the Assembly. They included the interest and sinking-fund charges on loans, the salaries of all persons appointed by the Secretary of State, and expenditure declared by the Governor-General-in-Council to be necessary for political or defence purposes. Moreover, in case the Assembly rejected any bill which the Governor-General deemed "essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India or any part thereof," he might certify it as such and forthwith lay it before the Council of State. If passed by the second chamber, it became an Act on receiving the Governor-General's assent; if rejected, it might still become law on being signed by the Governor-General. In the latter case it would not become effective until it had been "laid before each House of Parliament for not less than eight days on which that House has sat" unless the Governor-General considered such an emergency existed as required the Act to come into operation forthwith. Similar powers were given to the governors of the various provinces.

A special committee was appointed to deal with the question of the franchise. Mr. Montagu had intended this to be as broad as possible, and had declared that its limitations should be regulated more by what was practically attainable than by "any *a priori* considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification." Every endeavour was made to comply with these requirements. All who paid Income Tax, all who paid small sums as land revenue, or as rent, or as rates, received votes, as well as all retired or pensioned men of the regular forces.

But even so the numbers of voters amounted to only about one in ten of the adult male population, while, in the provinces in which female suffrage was introduced, women voters were less than one in a hundred of the adult women. Illiteracy was so prevalent even in this small proportion of the population that ballot-papers were usually decorated with pictorial symbols of each candidate, one for instance being represented by a tiger, another by an umbrella, a third perhaps by a sword or an elephant. Mr. Montagu might decry the Government of India as totally incapable of constructive effort; but it must be confessed that he himself was disposed to build without making sure that the foundations would bear the weight of his predetermined edifice.

The subjects which were assigned to ministers responsible to the legislatures chosen by this small but illiterate electorate were generally local self-government, public health, public works (excluding irrigation), education, agriculture, and the development of industries; the remaining functions of government were carried on as before, by councillors responsible through the Government of India to the Secretary of State and the British Parliament; and the governor of the province presided over both halves of his government. He had "to keep them in step and to see that a decision arrived at on one side of his government [was] followed by such consequential action on the other side as [might] be necessary to make the policy effective and homogeneous." An equally difficult task was laid upon the legislatures. They also were required to perform a double duty. For reserved subjects they had no responsibility, though free to criticize and withhold supply; for transferred subjects they were to exercise control over policy. The distinction, probably never very clearly grasped, was frequently forgotten, so that there was a marked tendency to attempt to exert over reserved subjects the same authority as

they were entitled to exercise over the transferred departments. Nor did there exist in any province a basis for the formation of other than communal parties. Where something like real parties emerged, as in Bombay, Madras or the Panjab, they were founded on religious differences. The Justice Party in Madras was anti-Brahman; the National Unionist Party in the Panjab shed its Hindu members and became Muslim. In general, the ministers chosen from the legislative councils had none but a personal following, which they often lost on taking office.

The ideas implicit in the new constitution evidently demanded a great change in the financial relations of the central and provincial governments, and indeed finance was to be one of the major problems which rendered the working of dyarchy peculiarly difficult. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report had suggested that resources to meet the expenditure of the central government should be set aside and that all other revenue should be handed over to the provincial governments, which in future would be responsible for provincial services. Various attempts had been made in the past to allocate the sources of state income between the Government of India and the provinces; and although considerable progress had been made, no scheme had succeeded in assigning distinct series of taxes to the one and to the other. Montagu thought that the final step ought to be taken, and proposed that customs, salt, income tax, railways and post office revenues should be allotted to the central government and that the other main heads should be assigned to the provinces. As, however, this division of resources would not have sufficed to meet central expenditure, a temporary system of contributions from the provincial revenues was to be established, to be calculated as a proportion of the expected provincial surpluses. The scheme as propounded in the Report

was strongly opposed in India, especially by Madras and the United Provinces, which would have been required to provide more than half the funds needed to balance the central budget. A special committee (the Meston Committee) was therefore appointed with a recent Finance Member as chairman, to revise the details of the scheme, but not to modify the proposed method of distributing the Indian revenues if it could possibly be avoided. The Meston Committee could not, therefore, do much more than vary the details of the contributions which had been proposed, basing its calculations, not on the anticipated provincial surpluses, but on the additional income which each province would secure in consequence of the new division of revenues. Its recommendations were as unwelcome as those of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, and were bitterly attacked in Bombay, Bengal and Madras; but despite the consciousness of shortcomings in these financial provisions, the contributions recommended by the Meston Committee were accepted, at any rate as a preliminary and experimental measure.

But all these elaborate calculations were falsified, and perhaps the fate of the constitutional experiment itself determined, by the slump which followed hard upon the end of the war. It had been expected in 1920 that even when the provinces had paid their contributions to the needs of the central government, they would still be left with a considerable additional income, ranging from 30 lakhs of rupees in the Central Provinces and 41 lakhs in Bengal to 157 lakhs in the United Provinces and 228 lakhs in Madras. To some extent these increases had already been mortgaged. The war had left arrears of civil expenditure to be made up. The rise in the cost of living required general increases in the rates of pay of government servants of all grades. The rise in the price of silver drove the Indian currency system from its well-established relations with the £ sterling and led

to violent fluctuations in the exchange value of the rupee, dislocating prices and hindering trade. When Lord Meston was making his financial calculations, he took the rupee at 2s. for the purpose of computing the sums which had to be remitted to England to meet the "Home Charges"—the costs of stores, pension, leave-allowances and the like which have to be met in London. But although the rate had been much higher in 1919, the Government of India failed to maintain the rupee at 2s. and it had subsequently to be lowered to 1s. 6d. These various influences had a most severe effect upon Indian finance, just at the time when there was every reason in the world to hope that the new provincial governments would be able to display their capacity and illustrate the beneficence of the new régime by embarking on schemes of betterment and nation-building. In every province but one the surpluses expected in 1920 vanished and gave place to deficits. Instead of new expenditure, retrenchment was the first task that confronted the unfortunate ministers. The reforms of 1919 were, therefore, tried out in most unfavourable circumstances, and the ministers were unable to point to specific achievements as an answer to the critics who described Mr. Montagu's reforms as a sham.

In view of the complications implicit in the dyarchic experiment, and the many disadvantages both in the nature of the time and in the lack of Indian political experience under which it had to labour, it is not a little creditable to governors, councillors, ministers and legislatures alike that dyarchy only broke down in two of the Indian provinces—in Bengal and in the Central Provinces. Elsewhere it functioned, irregularly and uneasily indeed, accompanied by a frequent slackening of the administrative machine, and against a background of growing communal strife, of periodic disorder, of intensified political agitation, and during its later years of profound economic depression.

Mr. Montagu had arrived at Bombay in 1917. The reforms ~~were~~^{had} established by the Act of 1919. They were brought into operation in 1921, when the Duke of Connaught visited India to inaugurate the new constitution. The interval had witnessed developments boding ill for the success of any peaceful mission such as Mr. Montagu had undertaken. The circumstances of the war had greatly aided the efforts of Indian revolutionaries. Germany aided them with money and arms. The Russian revolution soon established in power at Petrograd a government which desired nothing better than to accomplish a world-wide social revolution, to overthrow the "bourgeois" states, and, as an important step in this direction, to destroy the English empire in India. Revolutionary agents, adepts in the art of propaganda, began therefore to drift through Central ^{*}Asia towards the Indian frontier. At the same time the war with Turkey had deeply roused Muslim feeling in India. Muslim troops had fought reluctantly in Mesopotamia—it is much more than doubtful if they should ever have been employed there—while the mismanagement and misery of the first phases of the campaign gave sadly true reasons for urging that Indian lives—and especially Panjabi lives, since that province contributed far more than any other to the demand for combatant recruits—were being thrown away; and of the Panjab population half was Muslim. The victories secured later on in Mesopotamia and then in Palestine, and the overthrow of Turkish power, made matters worse instead of better. Mr. Lloyd George's declaration early in 1918 of his intention to dismember the Turkish Empire, perverted and exaggerated as such an announcement at such a time was sure to be, excited Indian Muslims beyond endurance. Living in constant fear of immersion in the Hindu world surrounding them, the Indian Muslims had ever clung fast to Islam beyond India. An agitation labelled the Khilafat Movement

sprang up among them. Its purpose was to preserve at any cost the one surviving independent Muslim power, and to save the authority of the Caliph, the head of the Faithful, to whom they had turned, and whose spiritual authority had been acknowledged every Friday in every Sunni mosque in India, ever since the last shadow of the Mughal Empire had vanished in the horrors of 1857. An unhappy multitude of Indian Muslims, largely from the Panjab, resolved to live no longer under infidel government, and migrated painfully into Afghanistan, only to find that life in the Dar-ul-Islam was much wretcheder than they had fancied.

One later development of this movement should be mentioned. In August, 1921, the Moplah Rebellion broke out. The Moplahs are a mixed Arab and Indian race, numbering about a million, and inhabiting the districts on the Malabar Coast. They are poor, illiterate, and intensely fanatical. From time to time in the nineteenth century small groups broke out in violence with a frenzied desire to become martyrs after slaying as many infidels as possible. The rebellion of 1921 was a much more general movement than had ever before occurred, occasioned by the excitement of the Khilafatists. While it lasted, it was a bloody business. Hindus were made to choose between circumcision and beheading; temples were plundered and desecrated; women were raped; villages were pillaged and burnt. A spectator might well have thought himself back in India of the eighteenth century.

These events were the more disquieting because, ever since the Hindus had begun to claim participation in political power, the Muslims had been conspicuously loyal. Ever since 1916 the discontented of both sides had contrived to make a temporary alliance. An agreement known as the Lucknow Pact had been made, by which power and place was to be divided between

Hindus and Muslims in a fixed proportion. Although no immediate prospect of honouring it had arisen, the two sections had each begun to regret the Pact, the Hindus as having given away more than they need have done, the Muslims as not having secured as much as they should. This divergence was, however, concealed as much as possible by the policy of a new leader who emerges on the Hindu side. This was Mr. Gandhi. With him develops a new and singular aspect of modern Indian politics, for earlier Hindu leaders had not claimed prophetic rank. If the Moplah Rebellion takes us back to the eighteenth century, Mr. Gandhi transports us to the Middle Ages.

He was born in 1869 at Porbunder in Kathiawar. He belongs to a subsection of the Bunnia caste, whose general occupation is trade, but which embraces a great variety of groups of different callings. For two generations at least Mr. Gandhi's family had provided officials of rank in two of the tiny states into which Kathiawar is divided. Both his parents were deeply religious, and his mother was much given to the observance of rites and to penitential fasts. He himself was married (according to custom) at the age of thirteen, and at once began to live with his wife, although he was still attending the local high-school. At the age of nineteen he came to London and got called to the bar. He then attempted to make a living by his profession in Bombay. Failing in that, he returned to Kathiawar. In 1893 he went to Durban to plead in an important case on behalf of an Indian firm, and for twenty years continued in South Africa, devoting all or almost all the proceeds of his practice to the cause of the Indian immigrants.

The Africander and the Boer, their colour-sense strongly developed by living amongst a large and primitive coloured population, were disposed to regard the numerous Indian immigrants as much the same as the native peoples, and not to discriminate between

machinery should be abandoned. Cloth should be made with spinning-wheel and hand-loom; journeys undertaken on foot; the law-courts, police and armies of the government should be dissolved. In fact, India should return to a condition even less protected than when Mahmud of Ghazni began his raids.

This doctrine was portentous. There was not the remotest possibility of Mr. Gandhi's carrying it into effect; but he was different from other Indian leaders. They were, many of them, men of brilliant talent. But their appeal scarcely extended beyond their own class and castes. Mr. Gandhi's message carried farther than theirs, and might reach another stratum of the Indian world. He hated Western influences as orthodox India had hated them in 1857; and, although he abhorred the carnal arm, propaganda might wear away the basis of all government. The only thing which could stir the whole Hindu world was the appearance of a saint who might "preach a vast religious revival and might point his texts at us," as a well-informed and stolid Englishman had said in 1873.

Mr. Gandhi had returned to India in 1915. His South African success had won for him a high place, marked by the popular title "Great Soul" (Mahatma), bestowed upon him at one time universally. He began almost at once to use in India the weapon he had wielded in South Africa. He took up the grievances of tenants in Bihar. He then encouraged the peasants in a Gujarat district to resist payment of the reduced revenue demanded after a partial failure of the crops. Then, in 1919, came the Rowlatt Bill agitation, which first placed him in the very centre of the Indian stage.

While Mr. Montagu had been cajoling the Indian governments to accept dyarchy, a committee, of which Mr. Justice Rowlatt was president, was inquiring into the Indian revolutionary movement and devising means

by which it could best be kept in check when the Defence of India Act expired. Its report was published about the same time as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, and bills were introduced to give effect to the recommendations in 1919. One bill was never passed, the other was passed but never put in operation. These bills were made the occasion of the most violent agitation that had occurred. It is evident that at this time the extremist Indian leaders thought the game was in their hands, that the Government was weakening, and that in a few months Indian independence would be an accomplished fact. They had many excuses for so thinking. Mr. Montagu's obvious anxiety to conciliate them, Mr. Lloyd George's espousal of the doctrine of self-determination, and the continued (though precarious) existence of the Hindu-Muslim pact, constituted a more promising situation than they had ever known. They had probably looked to the expiration of the Defence of India Act as a convenient opportunity for gathering their forces together, and the proposal to renew and extend the special powers of the government was therefore a thing to be resisted to the utmost. All kinds of fabrications were broadcast regarding the Rowlatt bills. It was said, for instance, that every couple would have to undergo a medical examination before marriage, and that every assemblage of four or more persons would be liable to arrest. Mr. Gandhi chose this moment to launch a passive resistance movement on a great scale. He and the Muslim extremist leaders had entered into a short-lived alliance. They had agreed, tongue in cheek, to accept his doctrine of non-violence; he had given his blessing to the Khilafat movement. Out of these circumstances developed serious troubles in the Panjab.

It swiftly became evident that passive resistance is possible enough on a small scale, when the resisters feel, as the Indians felt in South Africa, that violence would infallibly turn to their ruin; but that when undertaken

by a multitude it must at once degenerate into mob-rule, for numerous individuals, seeing numbers on their side, will abandon their self-restraint and attempt to secure their aims by force. The criminal element, too, always present on such occasions, will set them an example. Riots broke out in Delhi leading to eight deaths. In Lahore and Amritsar the bazaar-men were compelled to close their shops by intimidation. Three days later Mr. Gandhi, proposing to preach non-violence to the mob, attempted to enter the Panjab but was not allowed to do so. The next day the province was in an uproar. Five Europeans were murdered in Amritsar, and efforts, evidently concerted, were made to prevent the movement of troops by destroying railway lines and stations and telegraph offices. The Extremists, of course, laid the blame for this outbreak on the refusal to permit Mr. Gandhi to enter the Panjab, and the refusal was used to promote popular excitement. But if he had been allowed to continue his journey, his presence would have been used to exactly the same purpose.

Meanwhile, in Amritsar affairs had passed altogether out of control. On the 11th of April, 1919, the civil authorities there requested General Dyer to take charge. He had no specific instructions; he had only a tiny military force; and every hour was bringing him news of violent outbreaks in the surrounding country. He believed, therefore, that stern measures were necessary if wide-spread rebellion was to be averted. Few who have ever held in their hands responsibility for the lives of men will differ with him in this judgment. He prohibited all public meetings. On the 13th, in defiance of his orders, a meeting of some 5,000 men was held in the Jallian-wallah Bagh. He at once marched with half a company of men and opened fire upon it, killing 379 persons. This grim reminder of the possible consequences of rebellion brought the movement to a sudden end, and defeated the hopes of

some at least of the leaders, who had expected the Panjab to be in revolt at the very moment when the Amir of Afghanistan was marching into India. As it was, the Panjab outbreak occurred in April, the Afghan invasion in the following month.

I cannot help thinking that many more than 379 would have lost their lives on the battlefield or on the gallows if General Dyer had behaved like Elphinstone in Kabul in 1841, and had stood by on the 11th of April. It is certain, too, that Lord Chelmsford's government was guilty of a singular neglect in not immediately holding an enquiry into the extent and causes of the movement, for much evidence would have been then forthcoming which was afterwards suppressed by renewed intimidation. But the enquiry was long delayed. Open rebellion was over, the Afghans repulsed, and it then seemed more urgent to soothe the indignation of the Indian politicians than justly to assess the position in which General Dyer had been placed. Dyer was, therefore, dismissed, and a large section of the English public was manifestly indignant at what bore every appearance of sacrificing an able soldier to political exigencies. Many Indians at the same time felt deeply that the sympathy for Dyer was a mark of hostility to them, and complained that English feeling took no account of the fact that Dyer's fire had been limited, not by its effect upon the mob, but by the amount of his ammunition—in fact, that he had acted as in the presence of an enemy, not as a commander restoring civil order. And that also was true. No incident of modern times has been so fully charged with racial hatred.

These circumstances were used by Mr. Gandhi to develop a general movement of resistance to the government. In 1920, after Mr. Tilak died, he was unquestionably the most prominent of all Hindu leaders, while his alliance with the Khilafatists enabled him to pose as representative of both the Hindu and Muslim

communities. He proclaimed it as the duty of all India to refuse co-operation with a "satanic" government. All offices should be resigned, all honours renounced. The police, the sepoy, every civil servant should forsake his post. Students should refuse to attend government-controlled schools and colleges, and go to the "National" institutions which were to be set up, and where they would be set free from "the slave mentality" which the government sought to develop in them. Campaigns against the salt-tax were inaugurated. The liquor-shops held under government license were to be boycotted, and no one was to bid for the liquor-farms. All English cloth was prohibited. No one should wear anything but hand-woven cloth made from hand-spun yarn. Odd little caps of white cotton, called "Gandhi caps," became the outward badge of Mr. Gandhi's followers, and he exacted a vow that every one of them should spin a certain quantity of yarn every day. If only a sufficient number of men could be persuaded to pursue these ideals, he promised that India would secure self-government within varying, but always short periods of time. His journal, *Young India*, was full of promises and encouragement; and even congratulated his followers upon their wonderfully rapid acceptance of the principle of non-violence.

A large number of Indians accepted these principles in theory, but found themselves unable to put them into practice. For one thing the Hindu-Muslim agreement faded away. Mr. Gandhi had done his utmost to hold these divergent groups together. He had blessed the Khilafat movement, though no real Hindu would have raised a finger in its defence. He had at least half-blessed the Moplahs as brave and God-fearing people, even when they were busily circumcising or beheading their fellow-citizens. But these concessions to Muslim sentiment could not counteract the onward march of events. The Khilafatists saw that the Government of India had consistently pleaded the cause of the Turks, and they

saw the Turks contemptuously reject Muslim overtures and bring the Caliphate to an end as a thing that had long outlived its purpose. Their quarrel with the government thus ended, their quarrel with the Hindu revived. The conduct of the Moplahs struck a truer chord than any temporary friendship with a people of idolaters.

Nor could Mr. Gandhi hold even his own people together. Tilak had always felt sure that non-violence, was absurd. A brilliant Calcutta lawyer, C. R. Das, accepted non-co-operation against his better judgment. Tagore, the well-known Bengali poet, rejected it contemptuously. And those who accepted it carried matters so that none could have guessed that they were not common carnal men. In 1921, when King Edward VIII, as Prince of Wales, landed in Bombay, violent riots cost many lives. In 1922 non-co-operators murdered over twenty Indian policemen and burnt their bodies in their police station. Bloody struggles took place in the Panjab. Mr. Gandhi's followers could not be distinguished from common conspirators. Mr. Gandhi was at last arrested, tried, and condemned to six years' imprisonment. The judge who sentenced him observed that few men in India but regretted "that you have made it impossible for any Government to leave you at liberty."

Thus, for the moment, Mr. Gandhi disappeared from the political stage. The Congress, which by this time had become an extremist body, was heartily glad to be delivered from the saint's guidance; and the Terrorists, who had never even pretended to believe in non-co-operation, revised their old tradition of anarchist crime, especially in Bengal. So the dyarchic governments in the provinces, and the reformed Government of India, struggled on their way, against a background of violence, outrage and bloodshed, while Hindu and Muslim remained, at the end of the scheme, as inveterate enemies as they had always been.

CHAPTER IX

THE FEDERAL EXPERIMENT

THE Act of 1919 had declared that the elaborate political structure which it set up was to be reviewed at the end of ten years. This was in fact the acceptance of an idea which Morley had mooted when the Morley-Minto reforms had been under discussion, and which Minto had vigorously opposed as inconvenient and injurious. It was doubtless natural and perhaps inevitable to provide for the revision of a scheme such as dyarchy, which was admittedly temporary and provisional. But none the less this clause of the Act set the scheme at a disadvantage from the very beginning. As the Simon Commission, appointed in 1927 to report on its working, observed, the time limit gave it a makeshift air. "Those who have to work a temporary constitution," it wrote, with much truth, "tend inevitably to fix their minds upon the future instead of on the present. Instead of making the most of the existing constitution, and learning to deal with practical problems under existing conditions, they constantly endeavour to anticipate the future and to push forward the day for the next instalment of reforms. There is little incentive to try to make the system a success; on the contrary, those who are not satisfied with the advance already made are eager to prove that the temporary constitution is unworkable." Year by year in the Legislative Assembly resolutions were moved demanding full responsibility in the provincial councils, the establishment of ministers to deal with a number of central subjects, and the speedy

institution of dominion self-government. Such an attitude was natural in those who refused to play the part of ministers under the 1919 constitution, but it also affected those who were engaged in working it. Moreover, uncertainty as to the future intensified communal rivalries. The party-groups which formed were usually based on communal divisions, and they illustrated their loyalty to the cause of their respective communities by seeking to insist on an increased share in the patronage of government. But even if the knowledge that the constitution would be reconsidered at a fixed time had not cast these disturbing influences into the Indian political world, a mere ten years is too short a period on which to base a considered and well-founded judgment on the working of a constitution.

The Commission, consisting of seven members, represented the three main parties; but from the first Indian politicians disliked it because it was drawn exclusively from the British Parliament. On its arrival in India, the Chairman, Sir John Simon, invited the central and provincial legislatures to appoint committees in order that "joint free conferences" might be held between the Parliamentary Commission and the representatives of the Indian legislative bodies. The lower chamber of the central legislature refused to co-operate; and, accordingly, the Governor-General nominated an Indian Central Committee to serve instead. Each province, except the Central Provinces, complied with the request. While then the Report (usually called the Simon Report) represented the opinion of the Commission alone, that opinion was reached only after the Indian point of view had been expounded during the lengthy and numerous joint-conferences which were held. The Report was published in 1930.

It was a long and very valuable document, and provided an exhaustive and most illuminating review of the political situation and its immediate antecedents.

Among many other points, it called special attention to two of the principal difficulties which lay in the way of constitutional advance. One of these was the communal question, over which the Montagu-Chelmsford Report had passed as lightly as possible. It observed :—

To many [Indian political leaders] it seemed that, if there was a possibility of political control passing before long completely out of the hands of Parliament, it became important for each community to organize and consolidate its forces in preparation for the new situation that would then arise. Movements were set on foot by both Hindus and Muhammadans for the reconversion of classes which were said to have lapsed to the other faith. Suspicion and bitterness were the inevitable result, and in the excitement of religious festivals occasions for dispute were only too easy to find. By the middle of 1923, communal riots, marked by murder, arson and looting, were of almost monthly occurrence. In 1924 fierce outbursts occurred in many of the greater cities of the North. At Kohat, in the North-West Frontier Province, the entire Hindu population fled the town in terror of their lives. The year 1925 saw a lull in actual rioting, but the tone of the Press and of public speeches left no doubt about the intensity of communal feeling. In April, 1926, there occurred the first of a series of dangerous riots in Calcutta, and the following twelve months saw forty riots, resulting in the death of 197 persons and injuries to nearly 1,600.

By this time it had become clear to everyone that it was no longer a question of isolated clashes of merely local concern ; what was at issue was the All-India problem of the political relations of the two major communities. Communal representation in the legislatures, in the Government services, and in local bodies became the all-important question. Conferences of leaders, not only of the two communities, but of all parties, were held to find ways of securing peace ; for it was recognized that communal antagonism stood in the way of general political advance. But such attempts failed in face of the determination of each community to secure its political future

The second was the question of the Army, which Mr. Montagu had thought barely worth mentioning. But if India was to enjoy, what moderate opinion was loudly demanding, Dominion Status, the control, the organization, and functions of the Indian Army evidently needed statement and consideration. Probably, this portion of the Report was the most irritating to the minds of Indian politicians, but it dealt with a question on which the political future of India evidently hinges. It had never received the consideration which its importance demanded until Sir John Simon called pointed attention to it.

The normal political attitude of Indian leaders towards this matter is illustrated by the document usually called the Nehru Report, which was prepared in 1928. It agrees that Indian self-government without an effective Indian army is impossible. But it argues (1) that an Indian army exists and does not need to be created, and (2) that "None of the colonies was in a position to assume its defence at a time when a self-governing status was granted to it." Therefore, we must conclude, the army question offers no obstacle to the immediate attainment of dominion self-government.

Unfortunately, this remarkable triumph of ideas over fact is too fragile to bear any real weight. The Indian military problem, in the first place, is utterly unlike that of any of the dominions. The latter are either islands and therefore isolated by British naval power from attack, or they are so situated as to be immune in practice from danger of invasion. No one fit to live outside a mad-house can suppose Canada in danger of invasion by the United States. The Union of South Africa is unthreatened save by unorganized tribes. India, on the contrary, has always been and is still threatened by any power which establishes itself at Kabul. From the beginning of historical time India has been conquered, and reconquered, and conquered again by invaders from that region ; and the last invasion

of Indian soil took place not twenty years ago. In view of events in the last twelve months, can anyone suppose that India does not form a more attractive and, if left to itself, an easier prize than Abyssinia? In fact the Indian Nationalist attitude rests upon the baseless assumption that the last great war has been fought and that the political future will no more be affected by force of arms. The defence of her north-west frontier must always remain a vital condition of Indian self-government, and from this point of view it is certain that though India has been involved in war by her connection with Great Britain she has lived in security under the protection of British naval and military power. Since dominion self-government implies a readiness to assume responsibility for the defence of the north-west frontier against possible attacks by a European power, India must undertake a degree of preparedness wholly needless in any of the existing self-governing dominions.

In another respect, too, the Indian military problem differs from the problem of Canada, South Africa or Australia. The Indian Army is "distributed and habitually used throughout India, for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal peace. . . . Elsewhere in the empire this is little more than a theoretical consideration. The military is not normally employed in this way, and certainly is not organized for this purpose. But the case in India is entirely different. Troops are employed many times a year to prevent internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expected in all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore, well understood in India both by the police and by the military—and what is even more to the point, by the public at large—that the soldiers may have to be sent for. We have been told that this use of the army for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal order was

increasing rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practically universal request was for British troops.⁷ Unless then we are to suppose that the establishment of dominion self-government will miraculously allay instead of intensifying communal jealousies, the future dominion government will have to find not merely an Indian army for the defence of the north-west frontier, but also a force which cannot be suspected of either Hindu or Muslim prejudices to repress Hindu-Muslim commotions.

To these two problems must be added a third—the source of Indian fighting strength. This is a problem inherited from the social past of India. At no time known to history has the population as a whole been addicted to the use of arms. There seems to be no room to doubt that the Aryas, when they invaded India, brought with them a martial vigour not to be found in the established inhabitants. Later invaders and conquerors of India have always displayed the same military superiority. Under the influence of the caste system, there grew up a definite demarcation between the men who were good at fighting and the men who were not—a specific group whose hereditary occupation was warfare, and which for that very reason have usually held a position of high political influence and have always claimed social superiority. This historical fact has long been reflected in the groups from which the British Government has ever recruited its Sepoy army. It is entirely false to aver, as some have done, that British restrictions in recruitment have emasculated large sections of the population. British recruiting officers have always and very properly preferred the better to the worse military material. But their choice was determined by the aptitudes and desires of the people themselves. When the old Bengal army was constituted in the eighteenth century no Bengali recruit ever sought enlistment. The fighting men in that region were the

Rajputs and some Brahman groups of Oudh and Agra. They volunteered for service, the Bengali population did not. If any emasculation had taken place, it had occurred before the first Englishman had ever set foot in India.

It is the fact that some castes and races have behind them the tradition of a fighting life, and that others have not. The former are seldom found outside the United Provinces, the Panjab, Rajputana and the Maratha country. This limitation in space, in race and in caste is complicated by another limitation. These warlike groups have provided few among the host who have betaken themselves to Western education and adopted Western political ideas, and are scarcely represented among the political leaders. The base of democratic government lies in the belief that a majority of votes signifies a superiority of force in case a dispute is pressed to the last resort. But this is by no means true of India, where a majority of heads might easily coincide with a marked minority of effective sword-arms. During the late war, when every healthy man who cared to offer himself for recruitment was accepted eagerly, more than half the combatant recruits came from the Panjab, and three-quarters of them came from the Panjab and the United Provinces. An Indian dominion has, therefore, to reckon with the need of providing for its own defence and at the same time demilitarizing its effective soldiers.

The Simon Report was not inspired by a hostility to Indian political advance in bringing prominently forward a matter which had been usually left in a decent oblivion. It was, however, clear to the Commission that dominion self-government, with a responsible Indian minister of defence, was completely impracticable until the problems of the Indian army had advanced a long way towards their solution. The Commission was, therefore, moved to consider what form of political organization would

permit the nearest approach to the desired goal while taking into account the long-settled policy of never allowing the king's troops to be under the orders of men not immediately responsible to the Imperial Parliament. It seemed to the Commission that a federal form of government would permit the greatest degree of advance, especially if the federation could be brought to embrace not merely the provinces of British India, but the Indian states as well. At the moment when the Report was being written such a federation appeared remote. But Sir John Simon and his colleagues saw clearly that such a comprehensive union was indispensable to the smooth development of the Indian future. For one thing, British India and the states are in many regions so intricately interlaced that fundamental political change in one sphere would necessarily be accompanied by a like change in the other. "Popular movements on one side of these imaginary lines that form political boundaries cannot be prevented from spreading to the other. The time will come when there must be an approach to a closer relationship, and when new machinery must be devised whereby these divergent interests may be reconciled. . . . The first essential for internal peace and prosperity for both parts of India is harmony between them." But this could not be secured by the exercise of coercion—whether that of the Crown upon the Indian princes, or that of political propaganda directed by the politicians of British India in the direction of revolutionary changes in the states. Any attempt to exert pressure would be more likely to generate opposition than to secure the desired union, which would be established on a secure basis only when it was felt to be to the common advantage of both sides. Therefore, the Commission concluded, "the new constitution should provide an open door whereby, when it seems good to them, the Ruling Princes may enter on just and reasonable terms."

The desirability of uniting the Indian states with

British India was not, however, the only reason which influenced the Commission in seeking a federal solution of the Indian political problem. It pointed out the unquestionable fact that "there is a very definite correspondence between dimensions of area and population and the kind of constitution that can be operated successfully." There is no absolute limit to the size of population which can be governed, and governed effectively, by an autocrat. But 250 million people cannot be governed as a unitary democracy. The largest democracy ever seen, the United States of America, with less than half the Indian population, with a common speech, long political experience and a high standard of education, "consists of forty-eight states united in a federation. . . . Representative democracy . . . depends for its success on the possibility of a close contact between the elector and the elected person. Unless this is secured, it is not real representation at all." The proper aim then should be the establishment of manageable political units, which could be individually organized so as to correspond with their differing stages of political development, and on which full powers of local control could be devolved without abolishing that ultimate control over the central government which would at once bring forward the problem of the Indian army in all its embarrassing difficulty.

In adopting this attitude, the Commission evidently failed to realize that federation was much more than the ultimate possibility which it envisaged. But federation was in fact the only foundation on which a satisfactory political structure could be raised, and the discussion of this topic in the Report of the Commission and the arguments by which its recommendations were supported, did much to determine and crystallize public opinion in England. Perhaps the fact that the immediate proposals of the Report were almost completely ignored when Parliament actually came to legislate in 1935 is the

strongest testimony to the efficacy and importance of its advocacy of the cause of federation.

With federation as the ultimate goal of the central organization, "provincial autonomy" became a practicable experiment in some at least of the units which it was hoped would be grouped under the federal government. The Commission interpreted the term as the establishment, in the provinces of British India, of unitary governments responsible to legislatures elected on a wide franchise, although there was no need for these all to be constructed on the same pattern. "The essence of the plan is to afford to Indians the opportunity of judging by experience in the provincial sphere how far the British system of Parliamentary government is fitted to their needs and to the natural genius of the people." But the Commission felt strongly that this important step should not be taken, without a considerable broadening of the basis of representation, as otherwise "important elements in the population might fail to secure the voice in the affairs of the province to which they are entitled."

As regards the vexed question of Hindu-Muslim representation and the continuance of special communal electorates, it was pointed out that all the efforts as yet made by the respective communities to reach an agreement had broken down. "Yet the subject of communal representation is pre-eminently one which the rival communities should settle amongst themselves." Yet if they failed to do so, it was thought inevitable that the communal representation of Muslims must be continued, at all events "until a substantial majority of Muhammadan representatives in the provincial legislature declared themselves in favour of a change." On the whole, the Commission considered, the existing method of special Muslim electorates should not be abandoned for the alternative plan of reserving seats in a joint electorate, mainly on the ground that "the mere

reservation of seats . . . is far from securing the return to the legislature of Muslims who would be regarded by their co-religionists as authoritative and satisfactory representatives." A Muslim who received Hindu votes would not improbably differ much from the normal character of his community.

It may then be claimed with reason that the Simon Report was a constructive document of great importance. The Chairman had already, before the report was prepared or issued, suggested the expediency of convoking a conference in London at which the Indian States should be represented in order to secure "the greatest possible measure of agreement" between the states and British India in the proposals which were to be submitted to Parliament. The Commission, therefore, not only cleared the ground, by sharply distinguishing between what was and what was not practicable, not only defined the direction of advance, but also suggested the immediate steps which should be taken for the preparation of the most suitable measure that could be devised.

The next stage opens with the meetings of the Round Table Conference. It assembled in London in the autumn of 1930. At the moment Mr. Gandhi and the Congress were completely intractable. At a meeting at Lahore the Congress had passed resolutions declaring independence to be their object, refusing to participate in the existing legislatures, and empowering a committee to open a campaign of civil disobedience whenever it judged the time appropriate; and it had almost rejected a motion condemning the recent attempt on the lives of the Governor-General, Lord Irwin, and his wife. Mr. Gandhi and his extremist allies were, therefore, absent. Despite their absence, however, the Conference included representatives of all the principal Indian communities, and of all the major Indian political groups except the extremist Congress itself. The first session of the

Conference forms a great landmark. The representatives of the Indian states unexpectedly announced their willingness to enter into a federation "with a British India which is self-governing." The importance of this declaration can scarcely be exaggerated. For one thing, it brought the establishment of an Indian Union suddenly into the realm of practical politics. For another the central legislature on which the states were adequately represented would possess elements of stability which would be lacking in the narrower union of the provinces of British India.

At the second session Mr. Gandhi attended as sole Congress representative, having agreed with Lord Irwin to suspend his Civil Disobedience campaign. But his presence scarcely proved to be a source of strength. He made no constructive suggestions. He failed to agree with either the Muslim representatives or with those of the Hindu depressed classes. He was convinced that hidden meanings lay behind the simplest and most direct language, and returned to India to reopen his Civil Disobedience activities and thus court the arrest in which he was speedily placed. Saints can seldom make a success of politics.

The Round Table thus produced one great advance, and exhibited the political incapacity of the best-known Indian of his time. It did one other thing—it displayed the extraordinary difficulties which Indian leaders found in reaching an agreement on the communal question. An agreement was reached by the Muslims, the Hindu Depressed Classes, the Indian Christians, the Domiciled Europeans and the European commercial community as to the safeguards and extent of representation that they needed. But neither the Sikhs nor the caste Hindus would accept the proposals, and in consequence the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was compelled to make an award, which displeased every party in the degree in which a reasonably fair decision was bound

to do. Among other things, the award assigned a number of separate constituencies to the Hindu Depressed Classes. Mr. Gandhi announced that he would fast to the death if such separate constituencies were established, and this did indeed, lead to a compromise between the caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes, in which the latter secured considerable advantages over the former. It does not seem as if the caste Hindus have ever forgiven this intervention, which obliged them to accept a very disagreeable solution.

Meanwhile, a Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament had been set up ; it sat with a representative group of Indian politicians ; and it discussed and elaborated tentative proposals for a Bill issued by the government, and commonly designated as " the White Paper." On the basis of its report was prepared the Bill which became the Government of India Act, 1935. It declared the separation of Burma from India. This had been a reform long overdue, for there was much less reason for regarding Burma as a part of India than for regarding Ceylon as such. ¶

This change demands no more than a bare statement. But as regards many other matters a more elaborate exposition is necessary, and I propose to quote the Joint Committee's Report rather than the text of the Act, since the specific provisions of the statute say little of the purposes and ideas underlying its various clauses.

The basis of the new Act lies in establishing in British India provincial governments exercising sovereign powers and therefore co-ordinate with the Indian States with which they are to federate.

The scheme of provincial autonomy, as we understand it, is one whereby each of the Governor's Provinces will possess an executive and a legislature having exclusive

authority within the province in a precisely defined sphere, and in that exclusively provincial sphere broadly free from control by the Central Government and Legislature. It represents a fundamental departure from the present system, under which the provincial governments exercise a devolved and not an original authority. The act of 1919 and the Devolution Rules made under it, by earmarking certain subjects as provincial subjects, created indeed a sphere within which responsibility for the functions of government rests primarily upon the Provincial authorities; but that responsibility is not an exclusive one, since the Governor-General-in-Council and the central legislature still exercise an extensive authority throughout the whole of the provinces. Under the proposals in the White Paper, the Central Government and Legislature would generally speaking cease to possess in the Governor's Provinces any legal power or authority with respect to any matter falling within the exclusive provincial sphere. . . .

In these provincial areas are to be established legislatures in some cases uni-cameral, in others bi-cameral, which will enjoy exclusive authority in a list of subjects attached as a schedule to the Act, and authority concurrent with the federal legislature in a second list of subjects which cannot be specifically allotted to either the federal or the provincial spheres. The provincial executives will consist of a governor appointed by the Crown and a council of ministers responsible to the provincial legislatures. But the governor will lie under certain special responsibilities.

First, there are the proposals in the White Paper already mentioned. The Governor is to have a special responsibility for "the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of the province or any part thereof." The effect of this, as of all other special responsibilities, is to enable the Governor, if he thinks that the due discharge of his special responsibility so requires, to reject any proposals of his ministers, or himself initiate action which his ministers decline to take. Further, there flows from

this special responsibility, not only the right to overrule his ministers, but also special powers—legislative and financial—to enable him to carry into execution any course of action which requires legislative provision or the provision of supply. If, therefore, the Governor should be of opinion that the action or inaction of ministers is jeopardising the peace or tranquillity of the province, it will be his duty to take action to meet the situation. If the situation is one requiring immediate action, he can issue any executive order which he may consider necessary. If the situation is one which cannot be dealt with by an isolated executive order—if the minister in charge of the department appears unable to administer his charge on lines which the Governor regards as consistent with the due discharge of his special responsibility—the Governor can dismiss and replace the minister, or if necessary, the ministers as a body, with or without resort to a dissolution of the legislature. If he fails to find an alternative government capable of administering law and order on lines consistent with the discharge of his special responsibility, he will be obliged to declare a breakdown of the constitution, and to assume to himself all such power as he judges requisite to retrieve the situation. We are not contemplating such a course of events as probable; but, if it occurs, we point out that provision is made to meet it.

Lastly it is proposed to give the Governor power at his discretion, if at any time he is satisfied that a situation has arisen which for the time being renders it impossible for the government of the province to be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution Act, to assume to himself by proclamation all such powers vested in any provincial authority as appear to him to be necessary for the purpose of securing that the government of the province shall be carried on effectively. . . . Events in more than one province since the reforms of 1919 have shown that powers of this kind are unhappily not yet unnecessary, and it is too soon to predict that even under responsible government their existence will never be necessary. . . .

It is clear that where the Governor is exercising his special powers or is acting at his discretion, he must be constitutionally responsible to some authority, and that

responsibility will be in the first instance to the Governor-General acting in his discretion, and through him to the Secretary of State and ultimately to Parliament. . . .

The Act makes provision for the establishment of constituencies, and the extension of the franchise by Orders-in-Council. Minto's device for protecting the Muslim minority, reluctantly retained by Mr. Montagu and extended to the Sikhs, is continued, and plans adopted to secure due representation for other separate communities. The Joint Committee describes the franchise proposals as follows :—

The provincial electorate under the existing franchise numbers approximately 7,000,000 men and women, or about 3 per cent. of the population of British India. . . . But, since the franchise is in the main a property qualification and few Indian women are property-owners in their own right, the number of women thus admitted to the franchise was very small and does not at the present time amount to more than about 315,000.

The Statutory [Simon] Commission were of opinion that the existing franchise was too limited and recommended that it should be extended so as to enfranchise about 10 per cent. of the total population, and they laid a special emphasis upon the need for increasing the ratio of women to men voters. In 1932, between the Second and Third Sessions of the Round Table Conference, a Franchise Committee, which was presided over by one of our own number, was appointed by His Majesty's Government for the purpose of examining the whole subject, with a view to an increase in the electorate to a figure not less than the 10 per cent. of the population suggested by the Statutory Commission nor more than the 25 per cent. suggested at the First Session of the Round Table Conference. . . . The basis of the franchise proposed is essentially, as at present, a property qualification (that is to say, payment of land revenue or of rent in towns, tenancy, or assessment to income tax). To this are added an educational qualification and certain special qualifications designed to secure an adequate representation of women and to enfranchise

approximately 10 per cent of the Depressed Classes, it is also proposed to enfranchise retired, pensioned and discharged officers, non-commissioned officers and men of His Majesty's Regular Forces, and to provide special electorates for the seats reserved for special interests, such as labour, landlords and commerce. The individual qualifications vary according to the circumstances of the different Provinces, but the general effect of the proposals is to enfranchise approximately the same classes and categories of the population in all Provinces alike. We were warned, and can readily believe, that pending the preparation of electoral rolls the figures furnished to us must of necessity be regarded as only approximate. It is, however, estimated that the proposals in the White Paper would, if adopted, create a male electorate of between 28,000,000 and 29,000,000 and a female electorate of over 6,000,000 as compared with the present figures of 7,000,000 and 315,000; that is to say, 14 per cent. of the total population of British India would be enfranchised as compared with the present 3 per cent; and the proposals, therefore, go beyond the percentage suggested by the Statutory Commission and are nearly midway between the maximum and minimum percentages suggested by the First Round Table Conference.

We are satisfied on the information before us that the proposals, taken as a whole, are calculated to produce an electorate representative of the general mass of the population and one which will not deprive any important section of the community of the means of giving expression to its opinions and desires. The proposals will in the case of most provinces redress the balance between town and country, which is at the present time too heavily weighted in favour of urban areas; they will secure a representation for women, for the Depressed Classes, for industrial labour, and for special interests; and they will enfranchise the great bulk of the small landholders, of the small cultivators, of the urban ratepayers, as well as a substantial section of the poorer classes.

Thus, in the provinces of British India there is to be established, on a much less narrow electoral basis, a

series of governments which within the sphere³ of their own provincial concerns will enjoy representative and responsible government, limited only by the "special responsibilities" of the governor.

The structure of the federal government is necessarily a more complicated matter. Executive authority is vested in the Governor-General of India. Defence, ecclesiastical affairs, foreign affairs, and the administration of tribal areas are to be conducted by him with the aid of not more than three counsellors, responsible to him alone. The other federal duties will be discharged by him with the advice of not more than ten ministers, responsible to the federal legislature. The Joint Report comments on these proposals as follows:—

The Federal Government will be a dyarchical government and not a unitary government, the Governor-General's Ministers having the right to tender advice to him on the administration of a part only of the affairs of the Federation, while the administration of the other part remains the exclusive responsibility of the Governor-General himself. In these circumstances it is clear that the Governor-General's Counsellors, who will be responsible to the Governor-General alone and will share none of the responsibility of the Federal Ministers to the Federal Legislature, cannot be members of the Council of Ministers. It has indeed been suggested that, for the purpose of securing a greater unity in the Government, the Counsellors ought to form part of the Ministry, entering and leaving office with them, whatever the political complexion of the Ministry may be. An artificial arrangement of this kind, completely divorced from the realities of the situation, is in our opinion, quite inadmissible. The Counsellors could not by a simulated resignation diminish their responsibility to the Governor-General, nor would the Government become any more unitary than it was before. It is no doubt true that legal fictions which mask a change of substance by preserving the outward form have often proved a valuable aid to

constitutional development; but a fiction by which the form but not the substance is altered can serve no useful purpose. We hope, nevertheless, that the Counsellors, even if they cannot share the responsibility of Ministers, will be freely admitted to their deliberations—and indeed that there will be free resort by both parties to mutual consultation. It would indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the administration of the Department of Defence in complete aloofness from other Departments of government; and the maintenance of close and friendly relations with Departments under the control of Ministers can only increase its efficiency. We understand the intention of His Majesty's Government to be that the principle of joint deliberation shall be recognized and encouraged by the Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions. We warmly approve the principle, and we think that it will prove a valuable addition to the machinery of government, without derogating in any way from the personal responsibility of the Governor-General for the administration of the Reserved Departments.

The adoption of dyarchy in the central government is a feature which almost seems to invite criticism. No one can claim provincial dyarchy to have been successful, and more than one critic has predicted that dyarchy at the centre will do no better. But this view is not necessarily sound. Men sometimes learn by experience, and dyarchy may work better in the future than in the past, while the circumstances in which it will be applied will be very different from those of the old provincial governments.

The federal legislature is to be bi-cameral. The upper chamber, which is to be known as the Council of State, will contain 156 representatives of British India and not more than 104 representatives of the Indian states. The latter will be nominated by the rulers of such states as have acceded to the federation. The former will be elected by the various communities of British India, Hindu, Sikh and Muslim, by direct election, the others by

colleges consisting of the appropriate members of the provincial legislatures. The Council of State will not be liable to dissolution, but a third of its members are to retire every third year.

The lower chamber will be designated the House of Assembly. It will comprise 250 members from British India and not more than 125 members from the Indian states. It will sit for five years unless previously dissolved by the Governor-General. The members from the Indian states will be appointed as in the Council of State; but the mode of choice for the representatives of British India offered considerable difficulties. The Joint Committee presented the matter as follows:—

Direct election has the support of Indian opinion and is strongly advocated by the British-India Delegation in their Joint Memorandum. It has been the system in India for the last twelve years, and has worked on the whole reasonably well, though, it should be remembered, with much more limited franchise than that now proposed. The Southborough Committee which visited India in 1919 for the purpose of settling the composition of, and the method of election to, the Legislatures set up by the Government of India Bill of that year, did, it is true, recommend the indirect system, but the Joint Select Committee which examined the Bill were of a contrary view, and Parliament accepted the opinion of the Committee. It may also be argued that, with the increase in the size of the Legislatures now proposed, it will be possible to effect so appreciable a reduction in the size of the existing constituencies as to diminish the objections based on that feature of the present system. But even the reduction in the size of constituencies which would follow from the White Paper proposals will still leave them unwieldy and unmanageable, unless the number of seats is increased beyond all reasonable limits. Where a single constituency may be more than twice as large in area as the whole of Wales, a candidate for election could not in any event commend or even present his views to the whole body of electors, even if the means of communication were not, as

in India, difficult and often non-existent, and quite apart from the obstacles presented by differences in language and a wide-spread illiteracy; nor could a member after election hope to guide or inform opinion in his constituency. These difficulties would be serious enough with the comparatively limited franchise proposed in the White Paper; but future extensions of that franchise would be inevitable, and it is obvious that with every increase in the electorate these difficulties are enhanced. Indeed, any considerable extension of the franchise under a system of direct election would cause an inevitable breakdown. We do not believe that constituencies both of large size and containing an electorate of between 200,000 and 300,000 people can be made the basis of a healthy parliamentary system. We think that Parliament and Indian opinion should face these facts and should recognize that direct election, apart from its immediate merits or demerits at the present time, cannot provide a sound basis for Indian constitutional development in the future. We cannot believe that it would be wise to commit India at the outset of her constitutional development to a line which must prove to be a blind alley.

These arguments carried Parliament with them, and it was, therefore, decided that the House of Assembly should be mainly elected by the provincial legislatures.

The functions of the federal government, as has already been stated, are defined by lists of subjects classified as federal, provincial, and mixed. Among the federal subjects are included Defence, Foreign Affairs, the Post Office, communal universities such as Aligarh, emigration, federal railways, the regulation of labour, with other matters which should evidently fall under a general and uniform control.

The entrance of Indian states into the federation is provided for in an instrument of accession by which individual rulers declare that they accept the authority of the federal government and transfer to it such powers as are specified in the instrument, and further agree to

carry into effect in their individual states such provisions of the Act as are applicable. The federation will be established by proclamation made by His Majesty, after states comprising a population of half the total population of the whole number of states and entitled to half the seats allotted to the Indian states shall have declared their accession, and after both Houses of Parliament shall have voted an address to His Majesty praying that such a proclamation may be made.

The establishment of an Indian federation demanded two other changes of a considerable nature—a revision of the organization of Indian finance and the creation of a federal court. The main items of taxation assigned to the federal government are customs dues, excise (excluding excise on alcoholic liquors and drugs), the corporation tax, salt, income-tax (where not levied on agricultural incomes), and stamp duties. The note-issue is to be transferred to a central bank free from political influences.

A Federal Court, the judges being appointed by the Crown and holding office till they attain the age of sixty-five, is to be set up. It will have an original jurisdiction in any disputes arising between the federal government, any of the provinces and any of the federated states. It will thus operate in determining any points in the new constitution which may be in doubt, and especially in defining the limits placed upon the federal and provincial legislative authorities.

I think no one can study the reports of the committees, the proceedings of the Round Table Conferences, and the White Paper, without feeling that the predominant motive has been to set up a machine that will function. Indian critics have fastened upon the special responsibilities of the governors and the special authority of the Governor-General as indicating a desire to reduce the concessions to the smallest possible extent. But

their attitude will, I believe, change materially when they have had experience of the working of the new plan. It is utterly unlike some of the earlier plans which, in fact, withheld what they seemed to give. A later generation will probably look back to the frank and shrewd comments of the Simon Commission and of the Joint Committee with a growing wonder why such self-evident statements needed to be made.

Like everything else that England has done in India, this last Act is a great experiment. No one can say whether it will succeed or not. But unless all Indian politicians are deceived in their belief that representative and responsible government is suited to the needs of India, it promises a political structure under which Indians will be free to develop those political institutions which they have never before possessed, and to forget that disastrous communal strife and division which from time immemorial has always prevented the country from showing a united front to her enemies.

NOTE.

The quotations to be found in Chapters VIII and IX are printed by the kind permission of His Majesty's Stationery Office from the following official papers :—

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report Cmd. 9109 of 1918.

The Simon Commission Report Cmd. 3568 of 1930.

The Joint Committee Report H.C. 5 (Part I), 1934.

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